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Abstract: 
 
 
This thesis aims to problematize the inside-outside separation with regards to its 
impact on the question of ethics in international politics. In addition to the domestic 
and international antinomy, the self-other duality, which is at the basis of traditional 
(Kantian) ethics, is also problematized, as it excludes and suppresses the other. 
Therefore, an understanding of justice established upon universal principles and 
abstract norms is done away with in favor of political ethics that is flexible and open 
to change. The narratives structured around presence of an essence and a sovereign 
source of truth (be it the human or the culture) is also found problematical, as what 
they represent is not independent from how they represent. The universal human 
rights norms are discussed in such a framework. The justificatory reference to a 
universal human nature or particular culture is criticized, as such foundations are 
established at the time of their proclamation and further utilized to tame the 
difference within. Accordingly, just like the ontic account of state and security 
discourses built upon it are exclusionary and suppressive, a discourse of human 
rights, which is universal and strict, is found disciplinary and suppressive towards the 
difference. As a conclusion it is argued that the treatment of ethics and human rights 
in international politics should be assessed in the light of the backbone assumptions 
of the IR theory, ethics and the discourse of human rights. It is also concluded that 
we can command an ethical position, only when we leave objectifying the state, the 
human or the victim.   
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Özet: 
 
 
Bu tez Uluslararası İlişkilerde içerisi-dışarısı ayrımını etik alana yansımaları 
bakımından ele almaktadır. İçerisi-dışarısı ayrımının yanı sıra, geleneksel (Kantian) 
etik anlayışının temelinde olan, benlik (self)-öteki (other) ikilemi de, öteki karşısında 
dışlayıcı ve baskıcı bir tutum oluşturduğundan eleştirilmektedir. Böylece, daha esnek 
ve değişime açık bir “siyasi-etik” anlayışı, evrensel ilkeler ve soyut normlar üzerine 
kurulu adalet kavramına tercih edilmektedir. Bir özün varlığı üzerine 
temellendirilmiş anlatılar, (ki bu öz insan doğası olduğu gibi değişmez kültürel 
değerler de olabilir), temsil edilenle eden arasında yapay bir ayrım yarattıkları için 
sorunlu bulunmaktadır. Evrensel insan hakları değerleri de işte böyle bir çerçeve 
içinde değerledirilmektedir. Sonuçları bakımından ele alındığında, değişmez insan 
doğası üzerine inşaa edilmiş evrensel insan hakları normları da; her türlü eleştiriye 
kapalı kültürel görecelilik kavramı da kendi içlerinde baskıcı ve totaliterdir. Buna 
göre, nasıl ontolojik bir devlet anlayışına ve bunun getirdiği güvenlik söylemlerine 
dayalı bir yaklaşım dışlayıcı ve baskıcı ise; aynı ölçüde evrensel ve değişmez katı 
kurallara dayalı bir insan hakları söylemi de günümüzde birçok farklı kimliği 
dışarıda bırakmakta ve hatta disiplin altına almaktadır. Bu bakımdan Uluslararası 
İlişkilerde etik ve insan hakları sorunsalı, yalnızca Uluslararası İlişkiler anlatısının 
temel varsayımları bakımından değil, geleneksel etik anlayışının ve insan hakları 
söyleminin de temel argümanları ışığında tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışmadan elde edilen 
sonuç ise devleti, insanı veya mağdur kişiyi nesnelleştirmediğimiz 
(“şey”leştirmediğimiz) ölçüde etik davranabileceğimizdir. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a poetry in human rights that defies the rationalism of law: when a burnt child 
runs from the scene of an atrocity in Vietnam, when a young man stands in front of a 
tank in Beijing, when an emancipated body and dulled eyes face the camera behind the 
barbed wire of concentration camp in Bosnia, a tragic sense erupts and places me, the 
onlooker, face to face with my responsibility, a responsibility that does not come from 
codes, conventions or rules but from a sense of personal guilt for the suffering in the 
world, of obligation to save humanity in the face of the victim1  
 
 
This study aims to problematize some mainstream understandings 
regarding the place of human rights and ethics in international politics. In doing 
so, it is important to assess the issue from as many directions as possible. Studies 
that only criticize realist discourse of IR while remaining silent on the narratives 
of universal human rights or foundational ethics are deemed restricted. Similarly, 
the mere replacement of universality with cultural relativity would shift the 
ground of discussion while sustaining the simplistic reductionism. As will be 
discussed further in the following pages, if state is the black box of the IR 
theorician, and if culture is the blackbox of the anthropologist, human beings 
could be the black box of the philosopher. Simplifying life into units and facts 
while facilitating the job of the academician or the decision maker, at the same 
time results in a simplistic closure.  Moreover, those who are left outside of the 
boundaries are taken as the first to be sacrificed. Thus, the constitution of 
boundaries is a process that brings violence with it. Ignoring this and building 
modern political life upon ontological descriptions of statehood legitimizes the 
violence behind it.  
Also essentialist understandings of human nature behind the discourse of 
universal human rights apply the same logic to different actors. Taking into 
                                                 
1 Douzinas, Costas. 2000. The End of Human Rights. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p.245. 
  2  
consideration that lots of atrocities are committed in the name of humanity, 
prioritizing “the human” is not much different from prioritizing “the state”. If 
taken from the victim’s point of view the justifying ideology does not matter 
much as long as s/he is left outside of it. In addition, there is not a big difference 
between the violence of the universalist intervener and the local warlord, if they 
both end in the termination of the other. Consequently, rather than confronting 
“state” interests with “human” interests, we aim to show that there are no 
interests as such. Yet this does not imply that there are no “interests” at all. The 
important thing is to situate the discussions regarding human rights in 
international politics within a framework. Our framework, in this sense, will be 
the postmodernist approaches to human rights and international politics. We will 
try to focus on arguments developed by David Campbell, R.B.J. Walker, Cynthia 
Weber, Costas Douzinas, and Michael Dillon in criticizing essentialist 
approaches to politics and ethics.  
This study is an attempt to go beyond the rationalist narratives of 
international politics and human rights at the same time. It is an attempt to bring 
into daylight the similar type of reasoning behind descriptions that take 
international politics as an endless clash of interests and the discourse that take 
fundamental normative principles above those contingent interests. The “dignity 
of human being” may be a shield against atrocities committed in the name of the 
“integrity of the state” and “integrity of state” may be the shield against the 
violation of “human rights”. But if taken from the philosophical point of view, 
they both rest upon an ontic account: ontology of state and the ontology of human 
being. It is argued, on the contrary, that responsibility starts when one does not 
  3  
hide behind identity reinforcing banners but with courage to face the other with 
all its otherness; with all its alterity. As Jacques Derrida argued in the Force of 
the Law:  
That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unrepresentable exceeds the 
determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political 
battles, within an institution or a state or between institutions or states and others…Not 
only must we…negotiate the relation between the calculable and incalculable… but we 
must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the 
already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between 
national and international, public and private and so on2.  
 
 
So we will first start with problematising the distinction between 
international and national. Taking Richard Devetak’s interpretation on the 
treatment of ethics in international politics as a reference point, we will discuss 
the account of international politics that is framed by the separation of inside 
from outside. The first chapter of the thesis will be addressing issues like 
sovereignty vs. anarchy; security and insecurity. In our discussions we will try to 
stretch to meaning of concepts as far as possible. So a discussion of security will 
not be restricted to the state security vs. human security. Behind the discourse of 
security we will also try to understand the attempt to restore a sense of security 
towards the unknown. Furthermore, conducting a deeper etymological search of 
the word, we will understand how security is inclusive rather than exclusive of 
insecurity. Also we will understand how securitizing is a part of identity building. 
In this sense, the ontological statehood – accepting the state as an a priori unit of 
international politics- will be criticized as it ends up in the depolitization of the 
international order. Thus, problematising the ‘domestic’ in whose name the 
                                                 
2 Derrida, J. “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” in  D. G. Carlson,  D. Cornell, M. 
Rosenfeld, 1992, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, New York: Routledge, pp. 3-67 in 
Edkins Jenny, and Pit-Fat (eds.) 1999. Sovereignty and Subjectivity, London: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, p.9.  
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security narratives are structured, we will try to problematize ‘anarchic’ on 
account of which ethics is either left out or included in a restrictive manner:  
Theories of international relations contribute to the depoliticization of the international 
and the domestic every time they take for granted the separation of the two, with 
domestic realm within the sovereign state being seen as the realm of the “political 
community” and the international arena as the domain of anarchy, where political or 
ethical community is replaced by the power politics in some raw state of nature3  
 
The second chapter argues that apart from a particular account of the 
“international”, a particular perspective on ethics also play a prominent role in the 
treatment of ethics in international politics. We will, then, carry out a discussion 
on the philosophy of ethics and place of ethics in international politics. As a 
classical realist, Hans Morgenthau will constitute a prominent place in this 
discussion. Morgenthau’s idea that “International politics is not a terrain of 
ethics. Because politics treat people as means rather than as ends” is put under the 
spotlight. The philosophical background of this kind of argumentation will be 
discussed with reference to Kantian ethics. As a supplement to the discussion on 
the separation of the inside and outside that will have been focused in the first 
chapter; the second chapter will also contain a debate regarding the place of 
ethics in a realm of plural value judgements. John Rawls theory, “justice as 
fairness”, will find a place within this treatment of the international as a realm of 
contending conceptions of justice. Only after such a discussion, we will come to 
realize the common ground for philosophers of universal (deontological) ethics: 
the universal reason. Having drawn the reader’s attention to the metaphysical 
nature of such argumentations, we will pose the question that: “if ethics is 
something quite political rather than foundational, can we still sustain the 
separation between ethics and security?” Such a question is an important one, 
  5  
given the fact that among the reasons that are given to explain the exclusion of 
ethics from international politics, it is often stated that the priority of security 
excludes ethical concerns. Nietzschean understanding of ethics as “interiorized 
form of social control”, will give us the hint that the separation of ethics and 
security is an artificial one; not an essential one.  
The second chapter finally discusses the actors of ethics. Traditionally 
states are taken to be the primary actors of international politics. Ethics, on the 
contrary, is taken to be a realm of concern for the relations between individuals. 
While the attempt to attribute an intrinsic moral value to individuals remains an 
anthropocentric one, it also rests upon the belief that there is a subject capable of 
ethical calculation behind the actions. Thus an ethical account of individual being 
will be one of our targets in this study. Furthermore, it is because of and on 
account of this universal human nature that we care for the other, even if, s/he is 
outside of the boundaries. The belief that there is something universal, essential 
and of dignity behind difference acts like a ground for the construction of 
universal norms upon it, such as universal human rights norms. Concluding the 
second chapter, ethics is tried to be situated in between absolute presence and 
absence. Yet, the exploration of this area in between is left to the final chapter. 
Third chapter discusses human rights in international politics within the 
framework developed so far. 
In the third chapter, we will move from the general discussions of ethics 
to a particular focus on human rights. International human rights norms are but 
one among the various themes of ethics at international. The choice of “human 
                                                                                                                                          
3 Edkins, Jenny. 1999. Poststructuralism and International Relations .London: Lynee Reiner 
Publishers, p. 139. 
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rights in international politics”, as a subject, is shaped partially by the prominent 
place it occupies in daily politics. But even more than this concern for relevancy, 
the suitability of this subject for the exemplification of the discussions we have 
held so far constitutes the ground of our choice. The ontic account will continue 
to be problematized. The essentialist narratives of human nature upon which the 
universal human rights norms are established will be assessed as to their power of 
normalization and discipline. Just like ontological statehood is a project to tame 
the internal as different from the external, ontological humanness is, in a similar 
fashion, taken to be a narrative of something, which does not exist outside of this 
narrative. Consequently the idea that: “we should have human rights not because 
we are human, but to make us human”4 will be further explored with reference to 
what lies behind this idea of “human”. The ideas developed by Michel Foucault, 
in especially the Discipline and Punish, will be used to stress the disciplinary role 
of naturalizing something, which is indeed quite political. In this sense, 
Douzinas’s argument that: “The essence of man lies in [the] act of proclamation 
in which he linguistically asserts and politically legislates without any ground or 
authority rather than himself”5 will find its proper place.  
The disciplinary role of human rights norms will be separately discussed 
with reference to their role in the hands of state as the authority regulating rights 
and duties balance. As an attempt to open up the role of international human 
rights norms in maintaining the societal order, and the state security, a case law 
from the European Court of Human Rights will help to concretize the theoretical 
discussion of this chapter. The third chapter also problematizes the attempts to 
                                                 
4 Booth, Ken. “Three Tyrannies”, in Dune and Wheeler (eds.), 1999.Human Rights in Global Politics, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 52. 
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render culture as the essential, given and unchanging bedrock of human rights 
norms. Thus, we do not aim at the substitution of western interventionist with the 
local warlord. Every type of simplistic closures, (including some of the 
arguments known as “cultural relativism”) will be criticized.   
The final chapter of the thesis tries to substitute the simplistic closure, as 
discussed above, with an understanding of ethics that is undecidable. Here, the 
ideas of authors like J. Derrida, E. Levinas and Z. Bauman will be reflected upon. 
We will confront the Kantian ethics with, what may be called, the political ethics, 
in order to finalize the discussion started in the second chapter. The discourse of 
human rights that is problematized in the previous chapter, will be situated in this 
narrative of “political ethics”. Consequently, ontological descriptions of 
sovereignty, human nature, inside and outside will be done away in favor of more 
flexible and political concept of responsibility towards the other. Finally, 
sovereignty will be conceptualized as alterity rather than something above and 
beyond it. The ethical relation between the self and the other could then be 
understood as something beyond codes, conventions and rules. In other words, it 
is only, then, could be understood as a responsibility “in the face of the victim”; 
and only then can we come to the conclusion that: “there is a poetry in human 
rights that defies the rationalism of law”, as well expressed by Douzinas.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
5 Douzinas C., 2000, The End of Human Rights, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 93. 
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 At the end of the study we will conclude that an understanding of ethics, 
which is political and more flexible rather than the one built upon absolute 
principles and norms will save the “humanity”. Also that; the “humanity” is, 
again, not something above and beyond time and place. Finally, we will conclude 
that international politics, as long as rests upon ontic statehood (arguments like 
state security, national interest… etc.) will be complicit in the elimination of the 
other. 
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CHAPTER II: NARRATIVES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
Discussing human rights in international politics necessitates 
problematizing various concepts and assumptions of mainstream IR theories. 
Conventionally, morality has been distanced from the international domain. The 
“international” is based on a grand narrative of anarchy as the overarching and 
thus constraining condition of international politics. Traditional actors of 
international relations are taken to be sovereign states without much 
consideration. However, assuming such units as prior to international politics has 
severe limitations. It may be argued that similar acceptances govern our 
understandings of morality and human rights. The search for the formulation of 
general principles and statements concerning international politics, morality, 
human beings, and life in its broadest sense is the sovereign ground of scientific 
man.  
This chapter is intended to draw the reader’s attention to the results of this 
attitude and to some extent its blindness to the plurality and contingency of life. 
We will particularly focus upon the narratives of international politics. As, like 
everything else in IR, ethical questions also get their share from those narratives:  
 
The treatment of ethics in international relations usually begins with a description of how 
international relations is structured. It begins with an ontological description of state 
sovereignty, territoriality, and the distinction between inside and outside. This gives rise to 
an ethics based on distinguishing between fellow citizens and outsiders. Moral obligation 
is determined by the boundary that separates “us” from “them”. Ethics is therefore 
understood as something, which is more readily applicable relations within a sovereign 
state rather than relations between them.6  
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This description of international relations summarizes how we will 
problematize, in this chapter, units and security discourses. We can subsequently 
elaborate morality and human rights in international politics in the following two 
chapters. 
 
2.1 Sovereignty-Anarchy 
Anarchy at the international realm is often defined as the absence of a 
central authority above sovereign states. Ever since the development of modern 
state system, in the 17th century, sovereign-state is depicted as the ultimate center 
of authority. The presence of sovereignty at domestic level requires the absence 
of an overarching sovereignty at international level under the principle of 
nominal equality of states. There is a rich literature devoted to the explanation 
/description of this ordering principle (anarchy) of the international domain. 
Consequently, it is necessary to look at why this anarchy-sovereignty opposition 
is a problematical one. We will criticize those discourses shaped around the 
acceptance of an anarchic international ‘structure’ or an international ‘system’.  
We will use two definitions of sovereignty, which complement each other. One is 
the sovereignty of state, and the other is sovereignty in the form of reason. The 
former can be shown as a more institutional definition of sovereignty while the 
latter takes the concept as the source of truth, in its broadest sense.7  
 Traditional IR Theory takes states as primary actors of the international 
realm. A state in this sense is formulated as ontologically prior to its relations 
                                                                                                                                          
6 Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, in Andrew Linklater et all. 1996, Theories of International 
Relations, London: MacMillan, p.203. 
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with others. Some scholars, indeed, interpret this attitude as the continuation of 
liberal methodological individualism.8 
Accordingly sovereign states, as similar units, are claimed to coexist and 
form the ‘international system’. Sovereign-state, then, is depicted as the ‘natural’ 
actor of international politics. This acceptance enables mainstream IR scholars to 
theorize anarchy as the absence of central authority. David Campbell, in his 
article, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics” defines this situation referring to 
Derrida’s terminology of “metaphysics of presence”. Accordingly, in pairs such 
as sovereignty/anarchy, inside/outside and domestic/foreign, the primary concept 
(sovereignty, inside, domestic) is taken as the natural, original entity, or as the 
source of interpretation.9The secondary concept (anarchy/outside/ foreign) 
becomes meaningful subsequently. In this sense, primary concepts are believed to 
correspond to an incontestable fact in international politics, while the secondary 
ones correspond to the absence of this fact. For instance, anarchy at the 
international realm is defined as the absence of a sovereign center comparable 
with that of the domestic realm. 
We have to problematize this naturalness, originality, pureness, or unity 
of the concept of state sovereignty. We ask: Does it really correspond to or is 
representative of what it claims to be? If we take sovereignty as the reference 
point for anarchy, and challenge this reference point, then “anarchy” is also 
                                                                                                                                          
7 Camilleri also argues that the function of ‘sovereignty’ “has been to act as a fundamental source of 
truth and meaning…” in Camilleri J. A. and Falk J. 1992, The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a 
Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar, Hants,  p.11. 
8 Daniel Warner, for instance, criticizes the projection of liberalism’s ‘individual’ to the ‘state’ in 
international realm: “…the definition of individual that has been used in the analogy is wrong and 
because it’s wrong the analogy winds up glorifying the state in the same wrong head fashion that it 
glorifies the individual.” in Daniel Warner, 1991, An Ethic of Responsibility in International 
Relations, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers , p.45. 
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bound to be challenged. Campbell explains ‘anarchy’ as: “…anarchy, not anarchy 
in the sense of being without a central authority… but in terms of its Greek 
etymology, an-arche, that is being without being first principles, foundations or 
grounds.”10 If sovereignty (or inside or domestic) is not the first principle; (or 
foundation), then we could only define its ‘opposite’ arbitrarily.  
In the midst of this an-arche though, it is not the case that anything goes. 
What may seem a contradictory but a necessary condition, of at least writing on 
international politics, is an organizing thought: a sovereign reason. Ulrik 
Enemark Petersen states that: “What must be thought in the wake of God’s death 
and the reconfiguration of finitude as radical historicity must be a new 
metaphysics and a new ontological principle through which to make our common 
existence intelligible, so as to counter the decay of nihilism.”11 In other words, 
the place of unity and order becomes the reason. The complete absence of 
principles, foundations, grounds, or the awareness and consciousness of this 
absence would disable IR theoricians, politicians or any actor in the 
“international” realm to talk about, theorize, and conduct policies. A simulacrum, 
a pretension is elementary for even discussing on international politics even in the 
absence of ‘realities’. Thus, at this point, the presence of at least one sovereign 
center is inevitable. Otherwise the result would be complete chaos. This center 
becomes nothing but reason in the ultimate sense. The order of disorder is 
achieved at nowhere but at the minds of theoricians, lawyers, and practioner. This 
also challenges the ‘anarchy’ principle, because the central authority, in its 
                                                                                                                                          
9 David Campbell, 1996, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics”, in Shapiro and Alker, Challenging 
Boundaries, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, p.17. 
10 Campbell, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics”, p.23. 
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broadest sense, is bound to exist in the form of reason. This is the second 
‘sovereignty’, we have mentioned above. 
Richard Ashley is among the scholars of postmodern studies in 
International Relations, who challenges the anarchy assumptions of mainstream 
theories, by arguing how the international realm can be defined under the 
presence rather than absence of a sovereign voice. Ashley states the disciplining 
effects of anarchy principle at both the domestic and international levels. He 
writes in one of his articles that:  
To say that the heroic practices that impose a global narrative of domestication have no need 
for a visible central agency engaging in conspicuous acts of global discipline is not to say that 
these practices dispense with the presupposition of a sovereign source of truth and power that 
arches the totality of global life.”12  
 
In the same article he also argues that the sovereignty of state, or the 
famous raison d’etat, derives from not an external source but from the reason of 
man.  
 
In modernist discourse, the sovereignty of state, including the duty to obey the law it 
speaks, does not derive from any source external to man. Rather, the state’s sovereignty 
obtains in its establishing as the principles of its law, those historical limitations that 
modern reasoning man knows to be the necessary conditions of his free use of reason. 
[Time and place bound]. It consists, more succinctly, in subordinating   raison d’etat to the 
reason of man, making the former the guarantee of the possibility conditions of the latter.13 
 
 
 In Derrida’s terms, as there is no outside of this reason, international 
domain, as to its ordering principle, cannot be much different from the domestic 
one. Extrapolating from this idea, we downgrade and ignore the authoritive force 
of discourse in organizing international politics, defining anarchy, as the absence 
                                                                                                                                          
11 Ulrik Enemaark Petersen, 1999, “Breathing Nietzsche’s Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau’s 
Concepts of Power and Human Nature”, Alternatives 24,  p.92. 
12 Ashley, Richard, “The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and the Domestication of Global 
Life”, 1988, in Der Derian (ed.), 1995, International Theory, Critical Investigations, New York 
University Press, New York, p.106. 
13 Ashley, “The Powers of Anarchy”,  p.110. 
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of central authority. Without an authoritative principle or discourse, it would not 
have been possible even to talk about international politics, or an international 
order constituted by sovereign states, failed states, rouge states and non-states. 
Taxonomy in international politics may be said to be indicative of sovereignty. 
 Using Derrida’s terminology the opposition, sovereignty versus anarchy, 
which dominates modern IR theory, can be attributable to ‘metaphysics of 
presence’: we distinguish anarchy from sovereignty by accepting sovereignty as a 
given, as an ontological a priori to our theorization, and as a cause, rather than the 
result of our actions at the international domain. Nevertheless, this is not the all. 
In addition to the separation of sovereignty and anarchy, sovereignty is privileged 
over anarchy, as the normal state of affairs, as a normal terrain of politics and 
ethics. The latter [anarchy] is the result of the former. It is only reserved for 
power struggles, competition, technical calculations, and mechanical relations. 
Roy Boyne’s account of Derrida’s critique of presence, which results in the 
domination of one of the terms in a binary opposition over the other, can clarify 
our point. Boyne argues that binary pairs, like inside and outside, good and evil, 
heaven and earth, nature and culture, speech and writing, white and black… are 
not simple alternatives. They are hierarchical oppositions; one side of each 
opposition has privilege over the other.14  
One of the consequences of privileging sovereignty over anarchy is the 
substitution of politics by technology in international politics. J. Edkins accuses 
theories of international relations in the depolitization of international and 
                                                 
14 Roy Boyne, 1990, Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason, London: Unwin Hyman, 
p.125. 
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domestic levels, as they take the separation of the two for granted.15 If anarchy is 
depicted as the constraining condition of the international realm, and, similarly, if 
Hobbesian state of nature is projected onto this realm, then international politics 
becomes nothing but a technical endeavor to maintain survival. Conventionally, 
survival is given as a prerequisite for secondary concerns about the good way of 
life. Regarding this ‘logic of technology’ Richard Ashley argues: 
 
 …the economization of international politics can only mean the purging of international 
politics of those reflective capacities, which however limited, make global learning and 
creative change possible. It can only mean the impoverishment of political imagination and 
the reduction of international politics to a battleground for the self-blind strategic clash of 
technical reason against technical reason in the service of unquestioned ends.16  
 
This technology is the culmination of metaphysical thought, the 
calculative instrumental thinking, for Heidegger.17 Metaphysical thinking, in this 
case, is the account of anarchy (as the absence of sovereignty). It leaves us with 
nothing but calculations to best meet the contingencies of this anarchy. It turns 
“international” into a realm of strategic and contingent calculations. Thus 
international realm is characterized by conflict, and the domestic one with 
harmony. Walker states: “it is the claim to community and justice inside that 
permits the negative claim to anarchy outside.”18 The state of emergency 
“outside” is the normal condition, and this blocks the way to politics in a domain 
of conflict. As is argued at the beginning of this part, the sovereignty of state and 
                                                 
15 Jenny Edkins, 1999, Poststructuralism and International Relations, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 
London, p.139. 
 
16 Ashley, Richard, 1984, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, International Organization, 38, 2, Spring 
p.279. 
17 Campbell, Dillon (eds.), 1993, The Political Subject of Violence, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, p.21. 
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the assumption of domestic harmony ultimately lead to the principle of anarchy at 
the international domain. All can be pronounced at the expense of unquestioned 
acceptance of domestic harmony. A critical appraisal of the discourse structured 
around anarchy-sovereignty antinomy may reveal the immanent relation between 
the two. Sovereignty may be an effect of anarchy discourse. The discourse of 
anarchy, in other words, may constitute sovereignty in its political-practical form. 
Writing on postmodern analysis of state sovereignty, Caygill argues, “The state… 
does not act as an identity but is constituted as identity through its acts with 
respect to what is perceived as ‘foreign’ or ‘other’”19 Yet ignoring this fact, and 
assuming state sovereignty as “the primary constitutive principle of modern 
political life… reifies the practices of state sovereignty –the disciplining of 
boundaries, the affirmation of inclusions, the defamation of foreigners, the 
inscription of danger, the legitimation of violence.” in Walker’s terms .20  
Quoting Ashley, Devetak underlines the importance of the anarchy 
discourse, for the constitution of domestic harmony. He draws our attention to the 
violence on the way to this ‘harmony’ and argues that heterogeneity at the 
international level can only be claimed through the achievement of homogeneity 
inside.21 Hence, the discourse of anarchy at the international level needs to be 
accompanied by a discourse of harmony at the domestic level to be credible. If 
harmony, consequently, is an effect of discourse rather than the ‘reality’, it can 
                                                                                                                                          
18 R. B. J. Walker, 1993, Inside/ Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, Newcastle , p.74. 
19 Howard Caygill, “Violence, Civilty and Predicaments of Philosophy”, in Campbell, Dillon (eds.), 
1993, The Political Subject of Violence, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p.66. 
20 R. B. J. Walker, “Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary 
Political Practice”, in R. B. J. Walker, Saul H. Mendlovitz, 1990, Contending Sovereignties 
Redefining Political Community, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,  p.160. 
21  Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, in Andrew Linklater et. al., 1996, Theories of International 
Relations, London: MacMillan, p. 192. 
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only be achieved violently and arbitrarily. As such, policies and discourses 
shaped around concepts like security, national interests, state interests, and 
integrity of the state …etc. exemplify how sovereignty and attempts to maintain 
domestic security justify violence directed against domestic dissenters, 
minorities, and underrepresented groups.  
Another implication of the sovereignty-anarchy antinomy is the 
organization and discipline of identities/subjectivities. This is done through a 
hierarchical ordering; those of the domestic society and those off the domestic 
society. Nevzat Soguk reflects upon the role of refugees in this ordering:  
 
The efforts to construct the citizen (as constitutive of domestic community) by 
constructing an inadequate refugee or a migrant (a noncitizen) are directed in the final 
analysis at affirming the “sovereignty claims” that there exists a coherent domestic 
community from which the state receives its legitimacy and authority and on whose behalf 
state acts.22 
 
 We will also dwell upon the immanency of violence and 
sovereignty/security, when we focus more on the traditional concept of security. 
For the time being, however it suffices to keep in mind that to take sovereign 
states as entities ontologically prior to our theorization has political effects on 
people of ‘inside’ as well as ‘outside’. This demonstrates the naturalization of the 
boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Cynthia Weber’s following expression 
can be shown as supportive of this idea: “… sovereign subjectivity is an affect of 
practice and not a stable ontological category in itself. Ontology only appears to 
“be” because of the deeds that seemingly give it substance.”23 Thus, there is an 
                                                 
22 Nevzat Soguk, “Transnational/ Transborder Bodies”, in Shapiro and Alker, 1996, Challenging 
Boundaries, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, p.294. 
23 Cynthia Weber “Masquerading and the US Intervasion Of Haiti”, in Edkins,  Pin-Fat (eds.), 1999, 
Subjectivity and Sovereignty, London: Lynne Reinner, p.51. 
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immanent relation between defining (constructing) the international order as an 
anarchic one and taking state/sovereignty as given, ontologically a priori, and 
organizing subjectivities, within, outside, or in between of borders. Citizens, 
minorities, refugees, beggars and dissenters…the existence of all these categories 
indicates the existence of a sovereign center that organizes and labels. Walker 
puts this issue as follows: “The state has managed to successfully claim not only 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, but also over the meaning of 
human community and human identity.”24 
While discussing the constitution of subjectivity, Edkins underlines the 
importance of a master signifier, a center that organizes, and ‘provides a nodal 
point around which meaning is articulated’. She puts sovereignty as one of the 
master signifiers in modernity.25 It’s hardly possible to put sovereignty and 
suppressed subjectivities in completely opposite poles if we take the sovereignty 
as constitutive of subjectivity. It would also be problematic to put human rights 
and state sovereignty at two opposite poles on the political spectrum. Both 
national security, in the name of which domestic violence is perpetuated, and 
human dignity around which the banners of human rights activists are raised, are 
discourses of modernity. Michael Dillon’s following expression also emphasizes 
the inseparability of sovereignty and subjectivity and resulting relations: “More 
disturbingly for modern discourses of emancipation, neither can [the] call of 
justice arise from understanding human beings, as individual rather than 
                                                 
24 R. B. J. Walker, 1988, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles For a Just World Peace, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Colorado, p.103. 
25 J Edkins, Persram and Pin-Fat (eds.) Sovereignty and Subjectivity, London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1999, p.6. 
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collective sovereign subjects, as isolated and autonomous entities comprised of 
rights”26  
We should also keep in mind that the domestic realm is not exclusive of 
anarchy, heterogeneity, plurality, and conflicts. If it had been such, the strongest 
official justification of state violence towards its citizens, i.e. the phrase 
‘preserving the integrity of state with its nation and territory’ would be senseless. 
Similarly, we could not have understood why the state should be defined, in 
Weberian sense, as the only legitimate source of violence domestically. Even 
historically, the emergence of modern state is based upon the suppression of 
plurality inside the borders. The Westphalian state system, in the very end, took 
the place of decentralized political arrangements, characteristic of feudal society. 
This centralization was at the expense of domestic plurality.27 Consequently, the 
association of domestic society with harmony, rather than conflict, leaves in 
shadow the violence in the practice of border drawing, i.e. harmony construction. 
Lawrence J. Hatab discusses, from a Heideggerian point of view, the correlation 
of sociality and conflict. He argues that “the social” need not be identified with 
something like harmony or homogeneity since conflict is no less a social 
relation”. 28 
Taking into consideration anarchy at the domestic realm, and overarching 
sovereignty at the international realm, along with the an-arche principle, (if not 
‘anarchy’), we can challenge the separation of domestic and international politics 
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28 Lawrence J. Hatab, 2000, Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian contributions to moral philosophy, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, p.177. 
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in foundational terms. If anarchy and sovereignty are not two essential conditions 
of political organization but quite immanent, congruent, and compatible 
principles that are conditioned by our practices, practices of ‘states’, 
academicians, media, civil society, …etc., then separation of the two must have 
some political consequences. We already have focused on some of these 
consequences like depolitization of international politics, domestic violence, and 
constitution and control of subjectivities. These should not be taken as irrelevant 
items. Quite the contrary, they imply one another. 
Finally, one of the greatest consequences of this metaphysical attitude to 
international politics is the securitization of domestic realm. Differentiation of foe 
from friend, secure from insecure, and ultimately truth from fault, instigates a 
fight against doubt, foe and the other in our case. Identification of foe (threat) in 
security discourses first requires identification of friend (non-threat). Manning 
states in this sense that “… quest for protection against the unknown culminates 
in a tightening of the borders of the nation, the home and the self, resulting in a 
truncated life that conforms to the rationally knowable and the causally 
sustainable.”29 The search for security may be shown as the cause of political 
organization in its modern form. As home-like structures are established to 
conquer the feeling of insecurity, they are secure habitable places.30 This is not a 
novel idea, as at the root of Hobbes’s Leviathan stands the search for security in 
the state of nature. On the other hand, the search for security, the desire for the 
elimination of the threatening other, presupposes the establishment of a common 
identity based on which the other is to be defined. Security is both constituted by 
                                                 
29 Erin Manning, 2000, “Beyond Accommodation: National Space and Recalcitrant Bodies”, in 
Alternatives 25, p.53. 
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a common identity and constitutive of a common identity. Then, the security-
sovereignty relation turns out to be a chicken-egg problem. 
 
2.2 Security 
‘Security’, ‘strategy’ and ‘interest’ constitute the key words of traditional 
IR theories. They organize our thoughts in such a way that, they become the 
litmus paper for theorizing and policy formulation. Competing policy 
formulations and theories, founded upon this matrix of international politics, can 
do nothing but stabilize and secure this matrix. In Caygill’s words:  
All the categories can do is to specify the original matrix in some way; they cannot justify its 
particular structure. They allow us to measure, manipulate, exchange objects within this 
structure, but not to justify how it is we came into possession of it in the first place.31  
 
In this section, we will try to explore security from a different perspective. 
We will for instance, contrast national security and human security, showing how 
the former can oppose the latter. Yet before enjoying a trip in this security matrix, 
we need to enjoy a distance from it.  We will try to uncover, “how we came into 
possession of ‘security’ in the first place?” Security, as a concept, rather than 
security of this or that will concern us here. 
   Dillon problematizes the concept of security in the broadest 
possible sense. Dillon identifies modern politics with the security project; politics 
has always been ‘thought within’, ‘through’, and ‘by continuous reference to 
truth’.32 Dillon thus commands a Nietzschean sense of security, in which the very 
                                                                                                                                          
30 Manning, “Beyond Accommodation”, p.54. 
31 Howard Caygill, “Violence, civility and the predicaments of philosophy”, in Campbell, Dillon 
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act of knowing is an act of security against the unknown. Nietzsche expresses this 
idea in The Gay of Science as follows:  
 
Isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under 
everything strange, unusual and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us … And 
is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a 
sense of security. 33 
 
As we have mentioned previously, the unity of security and insecurity 
cannot be ignored just like the unity of anarchy and sovereignty. Dillon also 
focuses on this point suggesting that security engenders, rather endangers the (in) 
security of the ‘other’, the one, which is seen as a ‘threat’.34 We can better 
comprehend ‘security’, pursuing an etymological examination of the concept. 
The Oxford English Dictionary provides us with the following definitions of 
security:  
 
(a) The condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger, safety. (b) Freedom 
from doubt, confidence, assurance. (c) Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension, a 
feeling of safety of freedom from/ absence of danger.35 
 
Also the Greek origin of the word ‘security’ (asphaleia) draws our 
attention to the place of the other, i.e. insecurity (fault) in the very root of the 
word itself. As ‘sphallo’ means, in Greek, “to err, to cause to fall, or to fail, to 
bring down”, translated into Latin as fallo, whose noun form in English is fault.36 
As such, we can see the relation between security and threat, not as causality, but 
as immanency: security contains threat. Dillon’s reference to Greek mythology is 
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quite interesting with respect to Poseidon’s (God of security) identification also 
as the earth-shaker, “one who makes the earth tremble.” So Dillon argues in this 
sense that: “Poseidon, in short is a precise figure of the very duality of 
(in)security who serves to recall the intimate relation between the secure and 
insecure.”37 Again referring to Poseidon, Costas Constantinou draws the reader’s 
attention to the togetherness of security and ambiguity in ancient Greece, in his 
article “Poetics of Security”. He defines security as freedom from the care of 
danger, not from danger. In his words: “To remain afloat, one must cast an airy 
chest, learn to live with fluctuidity and instability…”38 This unity of security and 
ambiguity or insecurity means in concrete form that security simultaneously leads 
to insecurity, or security endangers, or “…the god who more than all others is 
bound to bring you low as he brings you up.”39 
It is important and necessary to pursue an etymological search on 
‘security’, as Constantinou argues: “A political narrative gains prominence…by 
erasing the fact that the words it is using [like security/asphaleia] as translated 
across ages and languages, are in and of themselves narratives and as such 
become a frontier for the clash of narratives.”40 The examination of the narrative 
of security teaches us that security can never be achieved in its popular political 
sense (protection from danger). 
The association of security and truth as well as the link between doubt and 
insecurity remind us the metaphysical position that there is an Archimedean point 
of view from which those concepts (truth vs. fault/doubt ) can be differentiated. 
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In this sense, security is the metaphysical ground of the political, transforming 
politics into technology (again in the Heideggerian sense of calculative 
instrumental reasoning). Politics, then, becomes a calculation, addressing the 
questions like how, through which policies, following which paths can we secure 
security (truth) in the best possible way? Given the constitutive role of security 
for politics in modernity, what is uncontested, and indispensable is the search for 
security (truth) per se, rather than its more concrete manifestations as the national 
security or the human security. We can discuss human security, environmental 
security, and planetary security vs. state security, international security, and 
national security. Yet, why do we need to be loyal to the word ‘security’? This 
impoverishes politics from the beginning, by creating two categories only: secure 
and insecure and grouping life with all its plurality under one of them. Thus 
security limits the possibilities. Another point is that security brings insecurity. 
As it attempts to build and maintain what it takes to be natural. 
 
2.2.1 Security Endangers 
Now, for practical purposes risking the distance, we have tried so far to 
keep away from the concept security, we will now enter into the matrix of 
security, and concentrate on critical security approaches as far as they are 
relevant to our main topic. 
Harmony between the representative (state) and the represented (the 
community/individual) is the leitmotif of traditional security studies. Richard 
Wyn Jones, writing on critical security studies, quotes from Christian Reus-Smith 
and underlines the fact that the consistency and coherence of traditional security 
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studies depends upon “the ideal of the state as a unified and relatively 
homogenous, coherent and peaceful community.”41  However, this does not mean 
that the account of these traditional security studies correspond to an actual 
harmony inside. This harmony can only be achieved through these accounts of 
political life. Examination of National Security Doctrines may be a case in point. 
 Walker puts national security as “… the easiest rationale available to any 
regime wishing to engage in internal repression or establish more effective curbs 
on democracy”42 Also; Alex P. Schmidt conducts a research aimed to uncover 
some of the discourses before the perpetuation of gross human rights violations 
by states and state-supported agents.43 Schmidt argues that: “Gross human rights 
violations as a matter of state policy requires a Manichaean ideology (based on 
enemy-friend dichotomy) that justifies it. The ideology utilized is the National 
Security Doctrine before [the perpetuation of] gross human rights violations.”44 
Likewise, Jack Donnelly indicates how National Security Doctrines are used in 
Southern Cone countries (Latin America) saying that: “National Security 
Doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s, provided an all-encompassing ideological 
framework for the military regimes of the Southern Cone”.45 Prohibitions and 
limitations on civil and political life are represented as necessary, unavoidable 
precautions for the maintenance of national security, integrity of society. The 
‘maintenance’ rather than the ‘constitution’ of societal integrity leads us back into 
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the famous separation between sovereignty and anarchy that we have discussed in 
the previous part. Walker, in his article “The Subject of Security” defines 
discourses of national security as normative or idealist doctrines which 
“…idealize the sovereign state as the norm against which international anarchy is 
projected by negation.”46 
The idea that preservation of the national security, or the integrity of the 
state with its citizens, constitutes a just ground for the limitations on and 
violations of human rights, and thus used by perpetrators of injustices as a way to 
legitimate their actions before a domestic or international community, raises the 
question of sovereignty with respect to representation. Starting from the 17th 
century and culminating in the 19th century, modern democratic state is 
understood “as the reflection of the will of its citizenry.”47 In this sense, the 
representation of the will of community became the ultimate measure of 
sovereignty. Political authorities’ actions are most of the time justified referring 
to the will of the community, if not that of its ‘individual’ members. If this had 
not been the case, restricting the rights of the citizens, imprisonment, or in the 
broadest sense punishment could have threatened the legitimacy of the political 
authorities, who got their power from the ‘people’. Yet, Cynthia Weber, in her 
book addressing the uncontested concept of sovereignty, with specific reference 
to intervention, finds it problematic to talk about not a membership to a 
community, but the community itself, given that boundaries are quite volatile. 
They are not natural but politically contestable, especially in the face of 
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transgressions by economy, interdependence, ecology, technology (e.g. nuclear 
weapons), and most important of all domestic groups excluded by the state.48 In 
this sense, the representation crisis may manifest itself also in the relation 
between the signifier, i.e. state, and the signified, i.e. the community. Weber 
refers to Saussure: 
 
 …And even though as Saussure argued, this relationship between the signifier and 
signified is a cultural and not a natural phenomena, the relationship between a signifier and 
a signified remains within a logic of representation so long as it is held that a signifier must 
refer back to a signified.49 
 
Therefore, if community, who is the legitimate ground of sovereignty, the 
signified, is contestable, then legitimation of sovereign practices referring back to 
this imagined society might in turn become quite contestable. In this sense the 
independence of justifications from practices also become contestable. Then the 
legitimization of practices may refer back to nothing but practices themselves. 
National Security Doctrines become arbitrary discourses meant to empower 
political authorities. We will also raise the point that grounds are constituted 
verbally at the time of their declaration, when we discuss human rights in the 
following chapters. But for the time being, Nietzsche argues that: 
Will to power designs purposes, reasons and uses for its manifestation. These purposes, a 
purpose of a punishment for instance, are quite arbitrary, and subject to change. The 
driving force behind man’s actions is the will to power.50 
 
 Remembering the unity of security and insecurity, it may not be fair to 
depict the state as only the source of insecurity: the source of security is again the 
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state. The modern political organization appears as the source of both security 
and insecurity of its subjects. Walker shows the modern sovereign-state as a force 
that enables us to imagine “what security could possibly mean”.51  
A practical remedy to this imbroglio may be the broadening of the 
concept of security. However, this has its drawbacks. Some of them are stated 
above. We will restate problems arising out of the concept of ‘security’ itself. 
Incorporation and acceptance of nonmilitary issues even by traditional security 
scholars52, such as environmental security, threats arising from international 
migration and resurgent nationalisms…etc., indicate both broadening of security 
and the development of new exclusionary practices. Those policies addressing the 
‘threat’ of migration and refugees may strengthen dominant discourses shaped 
around sovereignty-anarchy dyad. They identify subjects of inside and outside as 
argued previously. Environmental security may conflict with the security of 
indigenous cultures. Securitization of an issue may close the communication 
channels and prevent politics. Security starts where politics ends. Landscape 
burning traditions of Malagasy peasants and punitive policies developed by 
environmentalists and governmental officials in the name of environmental 
security are excellent illustrations. One reporter argues about the detrimental 
effects of securitization of environment in Madagascar:  
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The result of these politics- the regulation and even criminalization of a traditional 
agricultural practice- closes the lines of communication. …Farmers know that fires are 
strictly forbidden…Yet they depend on this useful tool, and so to protect themselves fire is 
not discussed, it occurs at night, and is blamed on “passers by” or “evil people”.53 
 
In conclusion, we can say that how we define threat and formulate ways 
to eliminate threat depends very much upon how we define it. James Der Derian 
in one of his articles tells about different accounts of security. This depends on 
how we formulate political life. Accordingly, security is a natural outcome of 
power struggles for Hobbes. These struggles are again natural responses to 
anarchy that is the overarching condition of natural society. Whereas for Marx, 
security constitutes a response to power struggles and alienation that develops as 
a result of capitalist economy. However, Derian quotes Nietzsche: “the history is 
one of individual’s seeking an impossible security from the most radical ‘other’ 
of life, the terror of death, which once generalized and nationalized, triggers a 
futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others… who are 
seeking similarly impossible guarantees.”54 It was this Nietzschean understanding 
of security; we have tried to project in this part. The stress on futility and 
impossibility of this security against alien others shows once more the 
problematic separation of same and the other. Ethics structured around this 
separation or conditioned by this separation appear problematic. Does this lead to 
Kantian cosmopolitanism? The answer to this question will be given in the next 
chapter. Extrapolating from this Nietzschean understanding of security, it may be 
argued that, if security from death is the condition of life, then the security from 
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the threatening other becomes the condition of political society. Consequently, 
security appears as a constitutive force behind identity construction. 
Drawing boundaries, differentiating inside from outside, friend from 
enemy, secure from insecure, and finally (but also primarily) truth from fault is 
the metaphysical ground of modern politics. Mainstream narratives and 
representations of international politics are built upon the same ground. Those 
accounts of morality in international politics are constrained by a particular 
description of this area. That description, narrative, or discourse of international 
politics, is questioned so far. In this chapter, the basic vocabulary of mainstream 
IR theories is problematized. This problematization was not exhaustive. 
Nevertheless we argue that the treatment of the ethical question, like human 
rights in International Relations is bound to be limited and problematic unless we 
question and destabilize the basic assumptions of the discipline. 
The treatment will be equally limited, if narratives on morality/ethics in 
both domestic and international domains are not questioned. The next chapter 
addresses this task. 
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CHAPTER III: ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
In the previous chapter, we have argued that ethics is taken to be 
applicable to relations within states rather than between, because of a particular 
narrative of international politics. It is the aim of this chapter to show that this is 
also a consequence of particular representation of ethics. In this chapter we will 
focus upon the treatment of ethics in international politics. For this reason we will 
question some of the mainstream acceptances governing the discussions on the 
ethics at international realm. In order to do this in a proper manner, we need also 
to refer to philosophy of ethics. However, rather than being exhaustive we will 
offer a limited discussion on the philosophy of ethics. Not each and every 
conception of morality will be analyzed. For example utilitarian approaches or 
moral philosophies of Ancient Greece and medieval philosophies with regards to 
moral realm will be left out. We will particularly concentrate on Kantian ethics, 
because of its dominant position in the modern accounts of moral realm and its 
impact on the mainstream discussions of morality in IR. It may be important to 
draw a distinction between ethics and morality from the beginning. While 
morality is something of the empirical realm, ethics is beyond that realm. 
However, during our discussions below, we may change our discourse between 
ethics and morality for the sake of argument. This should not be taken as a 
substantial choice but a practical one. We will restate the difference between 
ethics and morality in the final chapter of the thesis. 
 
3.1 Kantian understanding of ethics 
 18th century Enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant with regards to his 
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understanding of ethics may appear as a response to moral questions between 
frontiers. The stress on the universalizability of principles in Kant is manifested 
in its most concrete form in discourse of human rights. Understanding Kantian 
ethics would, therefore, also facilitate our discussion on universal human rights in 
Chapter 3. In this part, we will particularly discuss his ideas as expressed in his 
‘Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals’. 
Thomas Donaldson names Kantian morality as deontological moralism. 
He explains deontology as follows: “On a deontological view, an action’s form 
frequently includes reference to a guiding principle held valid for relevantly 
similar acts under similar circumstances.”55  Understanding this position is very 
important to place Kant in the discussion of morality. 
Morality descends from universal reason. Kant shows himself in sharp 
contrast to consequentialist approaches like utilitarianism by distinguishing 
between hypothetical imperative and categorical imperative. In the former, the 
special conditions and effects of conduct are taken into consideration, while in 
the latter, absolute principles (moral principles) guide the action. Moral conduct, 
in short comes out of the sense of duty rather than any other inclination.56 Kant 
puts the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperative as follows: 
 
If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is 
hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the 
principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical.57 
 
                                                 
55 Thomas Donaldson, ‘Kant’s Global Rationalism’, in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), 1996, 
Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.137. 
56 I. Kant, 1988, Fundamental Principles of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by T. K. Abbott, 
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, New York, pp. 17-70.  
57 Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, p.42. 
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This deontological or metaphysical stance, in Kant, may be put as the 
detachment of morality from empirical world and as privileging it at a higher, 
commanding position. Accordingly, moral conceptions have their origins in pure 
practical reason, unrelated with empirical contingent knowledge and even 
particular nature of that or this human reason, but “we must derive them from the 
general concept of a rational being.”58 Only this kind of superior source of 
conduct according to Kant makes it a moral conduct rather than a conduct for the 
satisfaction of particular desire, interest or inclination of the individual. On the 
other hand, Kant draws our attention to the problem in the practical applicability 
of this idea. 
 
Only here we must never leave out of consideration that we cannot make out by any example, 
in other words empirically, whether there is such an imperative at all, but it is rather to be 
feared that all these which seem to be categorical may yet be at bottom hypothetical.59  
 
Another problem in Kantian morality is that his refuge in universal 
principles as reflective of ‘pure morality/reason’ rather than contingent 
inclinations of particular individuals is quite vulnerable. He suggests that to be 
able to determine whether a particular imperative is a moral imperative or not, we 
need to universalize it and ask ourselves that ‘Could this principle, according to 
which we act, be a universal principle?’ One example of him may clarify our 
point. Accordingly, a man has a talent, and with some effort he can improve this 
talent. However, as he finds himself in favorable conditions, he prefers to indulge 
in pleasure. Kant asks at this point that: “if his maxim of neglect of his natural 
                                                 
58Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 39. 
59Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, p.47. 
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gifts, agrees also with what is called duty”60 His answer to this question needs to 
be given verbatim, in order to discuss his idea that moral principles should be 
universalizable: 
 
…He cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us 
as such by a natural instinct. For as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be 
developed…61 
 
 The use of adverb ‘necessarily’ in this statement constitutes a problem for 
us. It is highly contestable whether the ‘man’ mentioned in this phrase (with 
regards to his natural inclination to progress) represents the universal nature of 
humankind rather than that of the very particular, competitive, enterprising and 
progressive man of western liberal society. On the other hand, at this point to be 
fair to Kant, we should clarify one thing: The man in our example does not will 
that his faculties be developed in order to meet the requirements of the 
competitive society or in order to be happy, but because he acts according to the 
moral law. If he had acted in order to achieve a certain object; then he would 
have followed material principles rather than the formal practical principle of the 
pure reason62. 
Another example Kant uses to show the universalizability principle is that 
a man is in need of money, and he also knows that he cannot pay back the money 
he borrows. However, he makes a false promise and borrows money. Then, in 
order to decide, whether his action is a rational and thus moral action or not, Kant 
suggests that we should impersonalise and generalize. Accordingly:  “If R is valid 
                                                 
60 Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, p.51. 
61 Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals,p.51. 
62 Mary Gregor (ed.), 1997, Kant: Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p.37. 
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for me to do action A, then it must be valid reason for anyone to do.”63 Now, 
‘Anyone’ as the foundation of moral conduct is a mythical foundation. Thus, the 
reference to ‘anyone’ is also problematic, in following terms; this ‘anyone’ is not 
a particular person but anyone. Therefore there is no possibility of knowing that 
whether  ‘anyone’ would do this action or not. Everyone would refer to this 
mythical anyone in deciding to do something and consequently this anyone would 
control everyone in his/her actions. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that Kant intends to decide the moral 
quality of a conduct that will be valid for everyone; that is an objective and 
unbiased guiding principle. In universalizing the maxim, which the agent uses to 
justify his/her actions, we can decide whether he/she acted in accordance with a 
moral principle. It is further argued that if it is a moral principle, we can observe 
a logical consistency, universalizing the principle. For instance, “making false 
promises in times of necessity” cannot be a universal moral maxim, because if 
this had been the case, there would not have been promises any longer. Thus, this 
is given as an inconsistency.  
However one of the major criticisms against this logic as formulated by 
Hegel is that: The absence of promises constitutes an inconsistency or problem 
only in the presence of the moral belief that “promises should exist and be kept.” 
Therefore, according to R. Norman’s interpretation of Hegel, it is nothing to do 
with the universalizability or the abstract consistency of the principle in question. 
The principle ultimately depends upon the culture not upon any abstract 
                                                 
63 Richard Norman, 1998, The Moral Philosophers, Oxford University Press, New York, p.79. 
(Emphasis added). 
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‘reason’.64 On the other hand, it is not an evident fact that the premise, “promises 
should exist and be kept” is born out of culture rather than the pure practical 
reason. In fact the statement that we keep promises only because we think that 
promises should be kept, is even supportive of Kant, as moral principle comes 
before the empirical realm and guides it.  
Kant formulates the fundamental law of pure practical reason as follows: 
“So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a 
principle in a giving of universal law”65. With his reference to reason as a ground 
of the universal moral law Kant is taken as a foundationalist by some of his 
critiques. On the other hand, A. Reath in his introduction to the Critique of 
Practical Reason states that: 
Kant adopts a coherentist or non-foundationalist approach to the justification of morality, 
holding that the authority of morality cannot be derived from theoretical reason, or from a 
conception of content –indeed that it cannot be based on anything outside of itself66  
 
Kant refers to “pure practical reason” as the reason above the empirical 
realm but, by being practical, at the same time towards the empirical realm. From 
this point it follows that moral principles should be beyond and before the 
empirical realm, but they should guide the actions at that realm. In the Critique of 
Practical Reason Kant starts with the definition of practical laws. 
Practical principles are propositions that contain a general determination of the will, having 
under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is 
regarded by the subject as holding only for his will; but they are objective, or practical laws, 
when the conditions is cognized as objective, that is, as holding for the will of every rational 
being.67 
 
By making a distinction between maxims and practical laws, Kant aims to 
reach moral principles that are universalizable. However, an important remark 
                                                 
64Norman, The Moral Philosophers, p.82. 
65 Mary Gregor (ed.), 1997, Kant: Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 28. 
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that should be given at this point (in order to further discuss Kant’s representation 
in International Relations) should be that by universalizable principles Kant refers 
to the form of principles rather their content. He argues: “If a rational being is to 
think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can think of them only as 
principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter but 
only by their form”68. 
Finally, while Kant takes moral principles beyond the empirical realm and 
above it, he does not take them as fetters on one’s freedom. Quite the contrary 
Kant takes them as the condition of freedom in that:  
It is… the moral law, of which we become immediately conscious (as soon as we draw up 
maxims of the will for ourselves), that first offers itself to us and, in as much as reason 
presents it as a determining ground not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions and 
indeed quite independent of them, leads directly to the concept of freedom.69 
 
This is quite a different understanding of ethics and freedom as we found 
in the traditional narratives of International Politics.  One of the oldest 
discussions regarding the place of morality at international politics in the 
discipline of IR, is that of Hans Morgenthau in “Politics Among Nations”.  
 
3.2 Morgenthau on Morality in International Politics 
Known as the father of political realism in IR, Hans Morgenthau is 
famous for his separation of politics and morality. Morgenthau underlines the 
tension between moral behavior and political behavior, defining the realm of 
politics as that of power struggles. Among the six principles of political realism, 
he states: “(4) Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political 
action. It is also aware of the tension between the moral command and the 
                                                                                                                                          
67 Gregor (ed.), Critique of Practical Reason, p.17. 
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requirements of successful political action.”70 Underlining this separation of 
politics and morality is his particular vision of politics and his particular vision of 
morality. On the other hand, Morgenthau also draws the reader’s attention to the 
power struggles within the moral domain. He argues in this sense that: 
 
The normative order of society, whose purpose is to keep the power aspirations of its 
individual members within socially tolerable bounds is itself in a certain measure the result of 
social forces contending with each other for the domination of society through their influence, 
say on legislation or court decisions.71 
 
This may seem in the first instance, as a Nietzschean conceptualization of 
morality, where morality is brought down to earth from morality above and 
become an effect of power. Some parallels are drawn between Morgenthau and 
Nietzsche,72 with regards to Morgenthau’s broader conceptualization of power, 
something different from material power, and something that may be constitutive 
of norms in a society,  
On the other hand, while acknowledging power struggles in the moral 
realm as well, Morgenthau still separates the moral and political domains. In the 
‘Moral Blindness of Scientific Man” for instance, he defines politics as a realm of 
evil, which treats people as means rather than as ends. He claims that purely 
moral conduct -treating people as ends- is not possible in this evil political 
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realm.73 Because of the nature of political realm, and because of the nature of 
ethical realm, Morgenthau separates them. Apart from this, he takes the absence 
of “morals laws that govern the universe” in the international realm –due to the 
contingent state interests- as an obstacle to moral behavior at international 
politics. Among the six principles, Morgenthau states: “(5) Political realism 
refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws 
that govern the universe.”74  So far so good! Do we need moral laws that govern 
the universe? Does universal ethics, necessarily, what we mean, when we discuss 
ethics at international politics? 
In explaining his 4th principle, Morgenthau argues: “Ethics in abstract 
judges action by its conformity with the moral law…”75.  It is this understanding 
of ethics in abstract that makes Morgenthau dispense with morality in 
international politics. Accordingly, contrary to Kantian ethics, which is beyond 
and before the empirical realm, when norms are contaminated with politics, they 
become part of the evil realm. For instance, when discussing legal norms, 
Morgenthau underlines the impact of sociological and contingent factors on 
abstract legal principles. He, therefore, deduces that international law cannot 
properly be called law, as it is contaminated with politics.76  Morgenthau’s 
rejection of international law, combined with his skepticism towards morality at 
the international domain reveals an expectation of an indisputable normative 
realm, above the empirical realm.  
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Yet there may be a different understanding of ethics, which is contestable. 
In the last chapter we will spend more time on it. On the other hand, to be fair to 
Morgenthau, it is important to note that he makes a differentiation between 
absolute ethics and political ethics. He continues the above given statement: 
“Ethics in abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law” with the 
statement that: “ …political ethics judges action by its political consequences”77.  
Consequently, conformity to a moral law that is above the empirical realm 
while preserving the objectivity can at the same time be a limited approach due to 
its exclusionary tendency. Establishing a kind of objectivity may be necessary to 
act in a just way in the presence of multiple value judgments. In this sense a 
separation of empirical realm from the ethical realm may be important. Yet at the 
same time, the skepticism of political realism against ethics in international 
politics can only be understandable through this particular description of ethical 
realm that is above the empirical realm. Accordingly, ethics should be absolute, 
universal and incontestable, whereas international realm is too “crowded” and 
“plural” for such incontestability. 
 
3.3 Pluralism of Values 
The plurality of perspectives is given as an excuse for the skepticism 
towards moral questions at the international level. Gerard Elfstrom confidently 
states that: “ It should not be presumed that the right to work mentioned in the 
Declaration means the same thing in societies as diverse as the US, the USSR, 
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Togo...”78 Thus he concludes that an objective morality is not possible due to the 
plurality of interpretations (lack of truth) and international politics cannot be 
occupied by moral concerns, in the way domestic politics is. The pessimism of 
those who avoid studying moral issues, like human rights, can be attributable to 
their belief that those issues lack any foundations, so nothing can be built upon 
them, as they contain no truth. This is also a positivist argumentation: it reflects 
the belief that there are those objective and incontestable realms of truth. 
G. Elfstrom is right in arguing that the “right to work” means different 
things for people in different cultures. But we also should pay attention to what 
he doesn’t say: this plurality of interpretations is not something peculiar to the 
international realm. It may mean different things for people even in the same 
society. Does the ‘right to work’ mean same thing for a beggar and an 
entrepreneur, or a migrant worker and a citizen in the US, for instance? Then 
should we also avoid studying moral questions with regards to domestic politics? 
The relativity, undecidability, and unpredictability should not be taken as 
obstacles to deal with ethics. L.J. Hatab argues that: 
 
A main problem with traditional moral theories is that each has striven to provide a rule or a 
principle that can ground or govern the entire ethical life-world. But many moral situations 
are complex, variegated and constrained by contextual, temporal and cognitive limits.79 
 
 
The identification of the international realm with difference and the 
domestic one with unity has also some political consequences. Realist rejections 
of universalism in support of pluralism at the international domain are held at the 
expense of pluralism at the domestic level. Because national interests that provide 
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the pluralism at the international level, assumes unity and homogeneity at the 
domestic level. This is similar to what we have argued in the previous chapter 
while saying that the discourse of anarchy at the international realm comes with a 
discourse of harmony at the domestic sphere.  From a different perspective 
“difference”, just like “similarity”, when taken as something innate, natural, 
ontological is suppressive. Walker draws our attention to totalizing consequences 
of ‘difference’: 
 
 …That part of the tradition, which is prepared to take seriously the diversity of peoples and 
aspirations in the world, is precisely that part that denies the very possibility of a community 
of humankind. …In a less extreme form, it accounts for the rationality of nationalism in the 
modern world, a rationality which is simultaneously a form of collective idiocy.80   
 
That is to say, the emphasis on difference at international politics 
reconstitutes the differentiation of ‘same’ and the ‘other’. And just like the 
representation of the similarity is oppressive for difference, the representation of 
difference as an essential quality obscures similarity in difference. So morality 
between states is rejected also because it is believed that there are immutable 
differences.  Rawls seems to come up with a solution to this imbroglio. Although 
there is plurality of viewpoints regarding morality, and justice at the international, 
one among them, “justice as fairness”, becomes the overwhelming philosophy as 
Rawls argues. 
 John Rawls is a 20th century modern contractarian. He is also in search of 
universal ethical principles to guide relations within and between boundaries. In 
Rawls, also, we can observe the reason as the foundation of justice and morality, 
just like in Kant. 
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Rawls’s position needs to be assessed in discussing ethics in international 
politics, not only because he is among the contemporary philosophers who 
represents Kantian ethics in the 20th century, but also because he has an 
influential place in the discussions of human rights in international politics. 
 
3.4 John Rawls –‘A Theory of Justice’ 
The modern contractarian tradition represented by the 20th century 
American philosopher John Rawls is also among the influential doctrines on 
ethics in international politics. Here we will analyze his ideas with reference to 
his book published in 1971 titled “A Theory of Justice”. This book is not directly 
related with moral questions at the international domain, rather his later work 
“The Law of Peoples” particularly focuses on justice at this level. Therefore, this 
latter work may seem more relevant to our study. However, understanding the 
source of morality in Rawls requires us to focus on “A Theory of Justice”, 
because his latter study is generally based on the ideas that he presented in this 
book. We need to comprehend his ideas in “A Theory of Justice” in order to 
assess his relevance for moral questions in the international sphere. 
To begin with, Rawls gives the conception of justice as fairness as the 
prerequisite of well-ordered societies. Rawls acknowledges that people may have 
contending conceptions of justice, thus at the initial stage, which he calls the 
‘original position’, he privileges one conception of justice over others: Justice as 
fairness. 
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People decide upon the principles of justice, in what Rawls calls the 
“original position”, behind a veil of ignorance where ‘no one knows his place in 
society, his class position, or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in 
the distribution of natural assets and abilities”81(i.e. disregarding contingent 
conditions of social political and economic life). Two basic principles follow: (a) 
everyone will be equal; (b) the inequalities and burdens will be distributed in 
such a way that they will be to the greatest advantage to the least well off.82 
While arguing, “ Men are to decide in advance how to regulate their claims 
against one another, and what is to be the foundation charter of their society.”83 
He designs a moral order founded upon reason. He commands an understanding 
of rational and reasonable individual, as constitutive of this order. In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls explains “reasonable and rational” in an immanent and equal 
relation. He privileges none of the terms over the other, designing a sense of 
individual neither atomistic nor altruistic. He states in this sense that: 
“…reasonable society is neither a society of saints nor a society of self-
centered.”84   In order to reach this “well-ordered” society, Rawls rests upon the 
sense of justice as the transcendental condition. Behind the veil of ignorance 
(behind all contingency and difference) there is the capacity for a sense of justice 
and the capacity for a conception of good that enables people to come to the 
understanding of justice as fairness85. 
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 In the “The Law of Peoples”, Rawls extends his conception of justice to 
the international realm. He follows a similar procedure and starts from an original 
position where this time the representatives of peoples, disregarding particular 
assets of the societies they represent, such as territory, wealth…etc. decide upon 
the principles that will guide relations among societies.86 Consequently, he once 
more constructs a sense of justice between states prior to the relations they took 
part in.  
One of the criticisms directed against this second study of Rawls is that; 
this ‘Law of Peoples’ tends to leave out a very fundamental issue from the 
beginning: the question of what is ‘people’?87 S. Hoffman compares Rawls 
approach to justice in domestic society with that for the international realm. He 
states that:  
Here we already find one difference between ideal theory for domestic society and ideal 
theory for “peoples”: the former may provide guidance for the solution of political problems, 
while the latter tends to leave out some of the more fundamental issues from the beginning, 
e.g. what is a people and what is its relation to the state?88 
 
This question leads us back to the issue of representation that we have 
partly discussed in the previous chapter. Another point that may be criticized in 
Rawls is his reliance on extra-contractarian assumptions like the “sense of 
justice”, in order to reach the concept of political justice. David Mapel argues 
that: 
The most important external criticism of the [contractarian] tradition has always been that this 
reliance on extra-contractarian assumptions makes the contract itself as unnecessary shuffle: 
why not appeal directly to moral considerations that justify the contract.89 
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“A Theory of Justice” can be taken as a good response to extreme 
individualism of American society in the 20th century and its economic 
inequalities. Yet, taken as a general ethical position John Rawls stands not too far 
from the 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant. Rawls himself, states in the 
introduction to “A Theory of Justice” that: “The theory that results is highly 
Kantian in nature.”90 Therefore, Rawlsian “remedy”, for ethics in a realm of 
plural value systems, rests in the very end, on the Kantian principle: “treat others 
as ends rather than as means”.  
Another barrier to moral considerations in international politics is given as 
the requirement of survival and security. We have discussed the endangering role 
of the security in the previous chapter. Now, we will problematize the opposition 
between security and morality. Traditionally security is prioritized over morality. 
Consequently, some would-be ‘immoral’ conducts in domestic politics are 
justified with reference to this imperative of survival in international politics. Our 
point is that this is not immorality or amorality but a particular morality 
excluding others. 
 
3.5 Security vs. Morality 
A consequentialist approach in ethics is to argue that given the special 
circumstances of an entity, what can be depicted as an immoral behavior in 
private morality, may become moral given the requirements of prudence. This is 
the most common explanation behind political suppressions. We have already 
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discussed in the previous chapter that such references to security, domestic 
harmony, and integrity of state, merely cause the effect of ‘simulacrum’ in 
Boudrillard’s terms, with the truth effect of which one course of action is 
privileged over another course of action without a ground outside of its own 
representation.  
 Gerald Elfstrom argues in his book “Ethics for a shrinking world” that: 
“In the usual course, violent acts can only be justified to save human lives or 
restore the secure means of life.”91Elfstrom here takes the “restoration of secure 
means of life” as an unproblematic phrase, as if it is obvious to everyone. 
However, such general claims are usually subject to interpretation and my 
“secure means of life” could quite easily conflict with that of other people. 
Actually, violence is nothing but securing one’s way of life, at the expense of 
another’s.  
Apart from a consequentialist approach, but complementary with it, 
Elfstrom puts another traditional assumption on the nature of morality, when he 
says “Since individuals [in a Hobbesian state of nature] are in permanent peril of 
life and limb, extreme measures are justified in the effort to seek security. None 
could expect to survive for long if burdened with moral scruples”92 The question 
is what saves morality from being one of those “extreme measures to seek 
security”? We can contrast this depiction of morality with that of Nietzsche: “ 
Morality is nothing other than obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may 
be, customs, however, are the traditional way of behaving and evaluating.”93 
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Elaborating this idea, Keith Ansell-Pearson, at the Preface of “On the Genealogy 
of Morality” argues that: “ ‘Conscience’ is to be understood not simply as the 
superior moral faculty which makes each one of us uniquely human but as an 
interiorized form of social control, the disciplined product of the civilizing 
process of ancient morality”.94  In this sense morality appears not distinct from 
societal order but as a center that holds this order. Morality95 constitutes societal 
order and security.  Morality is security, as it is “an internalized form of social 
control” in Nietzschean sense.  That’s why Der Derian, in one of his articles 
states that: “In Nietzschean terms, norms, values, designs of good life are all 
products of positive will to power.”96 Also Mervyn Frost, in his book “Ethics in 
International Relations” sees morality as a necessary tool for society to maintain 
security. He argues: “Moralities are answers to predicaments which any society 
faces.”97 On these grounds morality vs. security opposition becomes 
problematical. Accordingly, the choice of security over morality is no less a 
moral choice. The choice of national security is a moral choice.  
Therefore, it can be argued that rather than taking an amoral position, 
political realism favors one morality over others. Yet whilst separating politics 
and ethics in discourse, it pretends to command an objective explanation of 
international politics not contaminated with value judgments. Separation of “is” 
and “should” is the basic assumption of positivism. For values the reference point 
of verification is taken to be conventions, and similar arbitrary social structures. 
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Therefore, it is believed that “…there is nothing beyond the conventions which 
can be referred to as final proof of the matter to somebody who rejects the 
conventions”98 Whereas for facts describing rather than prescribing the order of 
things in international relations, there supposed to be an ultimate reference point, 
objectively valid for everyone. This is the world-out-there. This bias is blind to a 
myriad of values, norms and subjective elements that provide the foundation 
upon which we are able to talk about this world out there. This immanency of ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ also determines the character of international law. Martti 
Koskenniemi argues in this sense that: “…[legal] doctrine is forced to maintain 
itself in constant movement from emphasizing concreteness [i.e. the practice, 
‘what is’] to emphasizing normativity [the prescription, ‘what should’] and vice 
versa without being able establish itself permanently in either position.”99 
So far, we have tried to examine the assumptions that support the idea that 
international politics is not a suitable ground for ethics. We tried to do this from 
ethics side, as we did it from international relations side in the previous chapter. 
To sum up some of the arguments we have come up so far: in the contingency 
and plurality of the international realm, there is no way to achieve universal 
ethics. When ethics is not universalizable, it becomes a part of evil power 
struggles. In a state of nature, security needs may be prioritized before moral 
concerns. As a response to these assumptions, we tried to counter argue that even 
if we accept the narrative of international politics as an endless struggle between 
states (for the sake of argument), morality needs not to be categorical or universal 
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or at the expense of plurality. Before concluding this chapter, there is one more 
assumption that needs to be examined. 
One of the arguments that can be come up across in the literature of 
international ethics is that the international morality is sui generis because agents 
of actions at the international domain are different from human beings as agents 
of moral conduct at the domestic realm.100 A critical reading of this statement will 
expose western understanding and privileging of individual as the center of moral 
behavior. 
 
3.6 The Moral Individual vs. ‘Being-ethical-in the world’ 
Primary agents of moral conduct are taken to be individuals, rather than 
institutions, companies, or states. Again, Elfstrom argues that just like 
computerized robots cannot be held responsible of their conducts, institutions are 
similarly programmed through their charters and legal guidelines.101 Therefore, 
they cannot similarly be held responsible. Similarly, the impersonalization of 
states may save them from moral responsibility. However, by itself, this would 
not have been a very plausible idea, since this impersonalization would also 
indicate the futility of expecting rational behavior from states. If states’ policies 
at the international arena can be evaluated as to their ‘rationality’ and ‘prudence’, 
they can well be evaluated as to their ‘morality’. A more central issue for us here 
is the place of individual as a moral agent and the idea of responsibility.  
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From a Nietzschean point of view, idea of responsibility in one’s 
behavior, rests on the separation of subject and the action (or the verb). It is built 
upon the idea that there is a “free-will” behind man’s conduct. In explaining this 
reference to free-will or subject as the source of action, Richard Norman refers to 
Nietzsche, and argues that our knowledge is conditioned by our interests, then he 
continues that: “A fundamental interest is to impose order on the flux of 
experience by positing stable and unchanging entities behind the change.”102 The 
subject -as the responsible agent- separated from his/her action plays the role of 
stabilizer. Yet we need to simplify complex events by showing them as 
manifestations of particular intentions. We have no foundation to measure those 
intentions apart from their particular manifestations. Nevertheless we assume that 
they exist. Thus intentions or subjects, apart from actions, are nothing but 
narratives. Norman further clarifies this point as: “We suppose that behind each 
human action there is a free and responsible agent who is the author of the 
deed.”103 The search for separate intentions behind actions may be another 
manifestation of the search of a ‘Being’ behind actions. 
 Individual is seen as the source of the moral conduct based upon his/her 
potential of being a responsible agent. But one should not underestimate the point 
that perhaps as a prelude to this sovereignty of free will in one’s conduct and as a 
prelude to its moral accountability, ‘individual’ is taken as a moral category by 
itself. Daniel Shanahan discusses the place of individual in modernity and argues 
that rather than signifying the uniqueness and peculiarity of human beings, 
‘individual’ “provides the very fiber of our moral character”, and he continues 
                                                 
102 Richard Norman, 1998, The Moral Philosophers, Oxford University Press, New York, p.144. 
103 Norman, The Moral Philosophers, p.144. 
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that: “when we say we are all individuals, we generally mean as well that, as 
individuals, each of us is capable of a moral existence.”104  
This way of thinking finds its most explicit form in Kantian ethics, as we 
have already discussed above. At the premise of “Treating people as ends rather 
than as means to one’s ends.” we can observe the idea of human dignity. 
Accordingly, central to Kant, every being has a value, and can be replaced with 
one another, or can be compensated. Whereas, the individual, as the source of 
value, is not something that can be compensated with someone else, it is 
irreplaceable, therefore has dignity, not value.105  
Thus, by being human, ‘individual’ is essentially given a moral value in 
itself. This centrality of individual or the importance given to human being can be 
presented as a result of particular western understanding. This depends in its turn 
on the separation subject and object, or ego and non-ego. Rob Walker contrasts 
this egocentric western philosophy with Chinese thought quoting from Chinese 
philosopher Fung-Yu Lan who argues that: 
 
In Chinese thought, however, there has been no clear consciousness by the ego of itself, and 
so there has been equally little attention paid to the division between the ego and the non-
ego…106 
 
 
The belief in the intrinsic moral quality of individual, at first sight, may 
seem as a remedy to the untamed individualism107. It can be argued that only 
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through an assurance of human dignity moral conduct can be possible. Otherwise, 
people would treat others as means to their ends and will not care for others. This 
kind of argumentation developed around the antinomy of self and the other is as 
foundationalist as the discourse of human dignity. Self is taken as the basis or the 
foundation for the treatment of the other. In the sense that a separation between 
self and the other is taken for granted. Only after this ontological separation, 
morality is attached to the self as a concern for the other. It may be resembled to 
the separation of fellow citizen (same/self) and the foreigner (other) at 
international politics. So the inside/outside separation is also maintained in 
traditional accounts of ethics.  
Heidegger, in “Being and Time”, puts the inseparability of self and the 
other in following terms: “Everyone is the other and no one is himself”108. Later, 
further challenging the distancing of self and the other, Heidegger argues that: 
“…one’s way of Being is that of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one’s 
self”.109 According to this idea of “Being-with-others”, the identification of an 
authentic self before its relation with the others and the world is an ontic account 
that takes individual prior to the relations in which s/he is involved. Just like 
Kantian ethics attribute an absolute moral value to the individual, the distancing 
of self and the other attributes an absolute immunity to the self. Indeed, it may be 
further argued that the acceptance of the ‘human dignity’, in Kantian ethics, as an 
absolute moral value, maintains this separation between the self and the other. 
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Respect for the ‘other’ by the ‘self’ can only be maintained through the 
establishment of a bond between self and the other. ‘Humanity’, as a universal 
moral category, makes up this bond. Yet this respect for the other does not, at its 
core, terminate the separation of self and the other. We respect the other as she/he 
is a human. This category sets new boundaries that we will question in the 
following chapter. 
Shanahan’s above stated argument, which situates morality in the 
‘individual’, rests on the fact that self is separated from the other, because he 
defines morality in foundational terms rather than in relational terms with ‘others’ 
(selves). Moreover, a challenge to this understanding of absolute morality is 
taken as an invitation for brutal clash of interests between self-centered 
individuals. Morality, according to this view, is achieved only with reference to 
essence of the ‘human’ so that it becomes incontestable. 
Unconstrained by a universal morality, individuals are believed to be 
‘unethical’ towards each other. Lawrence Hatab applies Heideggerian philosophy 
to his understanding of ethics and comes with the conclusion that: “As Being 
before reflecting upon beings is a Being-in the world, also Being before reflecting 
upon ethics is Being-ethical-in the world.”110As we have already discussed it is 
not possible to objectively decide moral principles because before thinking about 
“what should be done”, we have already been inscribed with “what should be 
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done”. Again in Heidegger’s terms: “Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, 
has that which is asked about.”111 
Consequently, the determination of the agent of moral conduct based 
upon its essential quality is a positivist tendency to separate subjects and actions, 
as well as subjects and objects. Taken from a Heideggerian point of view, there is 
nothing intrinsic in the ‘individual’ to make it the essential concern of studies on 
morality or ethics. Therefore, there is nothing in “state” to make it “unethical”. 
Also the problematization of the self-other antinomy challenges the arguments in 
international politics that favor morality towards one’s citizens rather than 
foreigners.  
In this chapter, we have mostly focused on Kantian ethics. As it is 
believed to be the most influential understanding of ethics in the field of 
International Relations. In this chapter, we have discussed the ideas of 
philosophers like Kant, Rawls, Heidegger and Nietzsche to a limited extent. 
Rather than presenting a detailed discussion on each of these philosophers or 
thinkers, we tried to benefit from their arguments in assessing the question of 
morality in the international politics. To sum up some of the main points of the 
discussion, we can put Kant and Rawls to one side, and Nietzsche and Heidegger 
to the other side. The former believe in universal ethical principles. The latter, on 
the other hand, reject foundational ethics that rest upon a separation of ego from 
non-ego, or subject and object. According to Nietzsche, there is not a serious 
contrast between morality and security. Therefore, it is not the case that: concerns 
for security would override concerns for morality. This idea can be used to 
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challenge the arguments like survival needs prevent moral considerations. 
Heidegger’s objection to positivist ontology, on the other hand, challenges, 
further, the foundationalist ethics that take for granted the separation of the self 
and the other.   However, as is argued at the introduction of this chapter, this is 
not an exhaustive study on either philosophy of ethics, or morality at international 
domain.  
Having, to some extent, problematized mainstream discourses of 
international politics, ethics and ethics at international politics, we can now move 
on to discuss human rights, as an ethico-political question in ‘international’ 
politics. As can be deduced from the first two chapters, we will criticize both the 
universalization of human rights as a result of our skepticism towards essentialist 
ethics and the denial of human rights with reference to the absence of a universal 
foundation. Ethics need not to be incontestable in order to be called ethics. It is 
not that either there are universal moral values or no morality at all for 
international politics.  
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CHAPTER IV: “HUMAN” RIGHTS VS. DOCILE BODIES 
In the first chapter, we have questioned the assumption that states are 
taken to prior to be relations in which they are involved at international politics. 
We have, therefore, problematized the ontological acceptance of states as 
sovereign units. We have argued that such narratives justify the violence 
perpetuated in the name of national security. We have also claimed that national 
security doctrines are generally behind human rights violations.  
On the other hand, we are against presenting a one sided view of violence. 
Violence can be perpetuated in the name of humanity as well as national security, 
in fact there is no difference between them. Just as “state”, when taken as the 
natural unit has some consequences,  “human” also when taken as a category, 
may end up being another disciplinary tool. In this chapter, human rights at 
international politics will be assessed with reference to the question of 
foundations and -in line with the general approach of the thesis- with reference to 
the discursive power of human rights.  
The 18th century declarations on rights of man are taken as the initial 
expressions of modern discourse on rights. The myriad of international 
documents protecting human rights can be taken as projections of the discourse in 
those early declarations. On the other hand, the 20th century has a peculiar 
standing with regards to the internationalization of human rights, not because the 
idea emerged in this century, but because the international human rights law, in a 
systemic way, largely emerged after the 2nd World War. We will not particularly 
dwell on the legal aspects of human rights in international politics, which means 
that we will not question the enforceability of human rights norms, nor are we to 
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examine global and regional legal bodies for the enforcement of human rights in 
detail. On the other hand, these bodies such as the European Court of Human 
Rights will concern us to the extent of their relevance to our major concern, i.e. 
the power of human rights discourse. Universal or international application of 
human rights norms can be defended or opposed. Regardless of whether or not 
such a defense or criticism is agreeable, there is at least an empirical validity with 
regards to application. However, it is something different to argue that there are 
universal human rights based upon an objective ground. States may be selective 
in their application/ defense of human rights norms. Or they may use norms to 
constitute and strengthen their identities. But such a discussion may be a matter 
for constructivist approaches in IR for instance. On the other hand, the 
examination and deconstruction of the language of rights is something totally 
different. Before problematising the discourse of universal human rights, it may 
be necessary to problematize a mainstream approach to international human 
rights as exemplified by Paul Lauren. 
Traditionally, the idea of international human rights is traced to ancient 
times. Early religious texts are presented as initial guidelines to man’s ethical 
relations with others. Paul Gordon Lauren, for instance, starts his examination of 
international human rights with a quotation from the Genesis: “Am I my brother’s 
keeper?”112 He tries to situate early ethical questions on man’s responsibility 
towards the other within the discourse on modern human rights. Though it meets 
the requirements of academic elegance, such an attitude could end up with an 
historical fallacy of exporting today’s mentality to yesterday. It would be too 
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general and vague to associate the modern language of human rights with the 
ethical callings of various doctrines and religions around the world. Taken in its 
most concrete form the modern discourse of human rights is a product of a 
particular epoch and a particular geography. Human rights is not, in other words, 
any form of moral responsiveness to others. 
On the other hand, once the internationalization, universalization and 
exportation of human rights became an issue for academic as well as political 
circles, justificatory grounds are searched not only in terms of establishing 
universal foundations for rights, but also in terms of creating a historical 
narrative. Disregarding whether or not Indians of Buddhist calling meant the 
same thing with the French in the 18th century or Woodrow Wilson in the 20th 
century, it’s comforting to establish linkages between different teachings to point 
to a universal direction in the development of human rights discourse. Lauren 
claims that “early ideas about general human rights” are not unique to western 
liberal societies, “but were shared by many cultures throughout the world.”113 It 
may be too harsh criticism to argue that those moral doctrines like Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Judaism or Confucianism are nothing to do with western liberal 
formulations of human rights. On the other hand, it would be too naïve to reduce 
the whole idea of human rights to a premise like “…first and foremost ethical 
principles of Hinduism is non-injury to others.”114 
The impact of the Enlightenment project was not the collection and 
organization and perhaps positivisation (legalization) of already existing visions 
on the rights of man. When Thomas Paine in 18th century Britain coined the term 
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“human rights” for the first time, he was not just writing to fight for the rights 
which are intrinsic and therefore natural to the man. But at the same time with the 
modern discourse around rights a very specific, rational man is constituted. “Man 
did not enter into society to become worse than he was before nor to have fewer 
rights than he had before…but to have those rights better secured.”115 
This conceptualization of “man” who is not in connection with others but 
as an atomic entity with moral capabilities and natural rights was the outcome of 
a particular narrative of Western tradition in the 18th century. Thus, it should not 
be mistaken that when discussing human rights in international politics, we will 
be able to command a universal language of the subject. Even though there is the 
chance of influence across cultures and intellectual borrowing, modern human 
rights is a western project. 
Thomas Kuhn discusses how, in the field of physical sciences, textbooks 
function for the invisibility of scientific revolutions, by presenting science as a 
cumulative enterprise. He argues that: 
 
From the beginning of scientific enterprise, a textbook presentation implies, scientists have 
striven for the particular objectives that are embodied in today’s paradigms. One, by one, in a 
process often compared to the addition of bricks to a building, scientists have added another 
fact, concept, law or theory to the body of information supplied in the contemporary science 
text.116 
 
This linear presentation of science, argues Kuhn, helps the scientists not 
to be lost but to find their place in the history of science.117 In a similar vein, 
literature of human rights, giving due regards to different sources of authority 
(like divine, nature, tradition, custom, reason) presents the idea of the universality 
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of human rights as an ongoing concern and theme of political history. Moral 
understanding of the 18th century is backed up with that of the middle ages and 
then universalized to solidify, justify, and dignify the internationalization of 
human rights in the 20th century. Internationalization of human rights is almost 
presented as an inevitable outcome of the flow of history. This generalization of 
what indeed reflects the mentality of a particular epoch and geography, incites 
debates on the universality or relativity of human rights. We can turn to these 
debates. 
 
4.1 Universality vs. Cultural Relativity 
 
Universalism vs. cultural relativism debate commands a central place in 
the literature of human rights. Human rights in international politics can be 
analyzed from many different perspectives. If the examination of historical 
development of human rights norms with different fashions118 is one path to be 
followed, problematization of enforcement mechanisms at international scale is 
another. Different international organizations and NGOs as well as states may be 
examined as to their records on human rights. “Sovereignty” may be clashed with 
“humanitarian intervention”. The status of individuals in international law may be 
brought to the stage and so on. Whatever the different standpoints of researchers, 
they either pay lip service to the universalism-relativism debate by allocating at 
least a chapter to this issue in their studies, or exemplify one of those approaches 
with their main arguments. An enthusiastic activist who tells the gradual progress 
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of humanity in realizing human rights norms finds his/her philosophical bedrock 
in universalism. The strong emphasis on the “westerness” of human rights norms 
might point to the authors’ sympathy with cultural relativism. 
Discussing the universalism or relativism of rights with reference to fixed 
grounds, constitutes the metaphysical aspects of this narrative. Whatever the 
different arguments of universalists and relativists, perhaps it should be put 
straightforward from the beginning that the very phrase “human rights” reflects a 
universalist ideology. Vincent argues that addition of “human” to rights, which 
are most often defined as entitlements, “justifiable claims, legal or moral grounds 
to have or obtain something or to act in a certain way”119, means that: “The 
subjects of human rights are not members of this or that society, but of the 
community of humankind.”120 Also Maurice Cranston puts forward the idea of 
universality in human rights as follows:  
 
A human right by definition is a universal moral right, something which all men, everywhere, 
at all times ought to have, something which no one may be without a grave affront to justice, 
something which is owing to every human being simply because he is human.121 
 
Formulated in these terms the “relativity” of human rights may constitute 
a paradox. As the very term “human” implies a categorical definition of rights, 
categorical ethics may be an inevitable outcome of talking about the rights of 
“human beings”. Criticizing the universality of human rights may, from this 
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perspective, be identical with devaluation of human rights.122 One can argue that 
the degree or the source of universality or the meaning of universality can be 
discussed. However, if we reject a  (universal) ground for human rights we 
indeed reject human rights evacuating a space for tyrants, oppressors and the 
powerful. To what extent human rights is the language of the weak or to what 
extent it is an emancipatory ideal will be the subject of the next section. We 
purport to show that rejection of universal grounds may re-politicize the 
discourse of human rights, bringing in its political power against despotic 
regimes, in this and the next chapter. Moreover, we neither aim to bridge a gap 
between universalism and cultural relativism, nor do we aim to choose one of 
them. In classifying the proximity of these two positions, we indeed aim to 
criticize both. 
Universalism-Relativism debates, in the mainstream literature of 
international human rights, for so long, have been centered on individual versus 
collective rights, Eastern versus Western values and concerns of North versus 
South. These are also literally defined as three generations of rights: Civil and 
Political Rights; Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and finally Collective 
Rights. Circumscribed by Cold War politics, the universalism-relativism debate 
constituted, generally, a debate over daily politics rather than a discussion over 
methodology. Definitions of cultural relativism are followed by discussions 
covering how western individual based rights differed from their eastern 
counterparts. For instance, a Malaysian activist, Chandra Muzaffar, argues: “The 
equation of human rights with individual civil and political rights is a product of 
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the European Enlightenment…”123 In these debates, western “human nature and 
dignity” is almost compared with eastern or southern “community” “society” and 
“culture”. Scholars from the “cultured” East and South criticized their Western 
colleagues for being neo-colonialist preachers, while the West associated 
“cultural relativists” with local warlords and oppressors. Blind to their own 
positions, both parties accused the other side of being essentialist. Universalists 
were essentialists because they were presenting an essential and universal human 
nature as the justification of rights that are held irrespective of one’s race, sex, 
and color. Cultural relativists were essentialists because they were presenting 
culture as the sole source of all values as the womb of human rights norms. Ken 
Booth, for instance sees cultural relativism as cultural essentialism that 
suppresses internal criticism. He argues that culture is as contestable as race is 
and even it can be stated that culture is the blackbox of anthropologist just like 
state is that of the IR theoricians124. If state is the blackbox of (classical) IR 
theoricians and if culture is the blackbox of anthropologist, why should “human” 
not be the blackbox of the universalist philosopher? 
In order to facilitate the comparative analysis of universalists and 
cultural relativists, let’s now focus on definitions of universalism and cultural 
relativism as provided by various scholars. Jack Donnelly, who identifies 
himself as a weak relativist, presents different degrees of relativisms 
(universalisms). Accordingly; 
1. radical universalism:  “all values, including human rights are entirely universal, in no 
way subject to modification in light of cultural or historical differences” 
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2. radical relativism: “culture is the source of all values” 
3. strong relativism (universalism): universality checks culturally specific values. 
4. Weak relativism (universalism): universal principles are molded into cultural 
particularities through interpretation and implementation.125 
John Tilley defines universalism as follows: “universalism is the view that 
some moral judgements are universally valid” (not necessarily applied).126 Baehr, 
on the other hand, associates universality with the practice and presence of 
common values. He attributes the absence of  regional human rights organization 
in Asia-Pacific comparable with those of Africa, the US or Europe, to the absence 
of shared values in a terrain of plural cultures.127 Vincent suggests reaching 
universal principles by distilling from multiplicity of cultures some core values; 
he names this approach as the “lowest common denominator”128. Similarly, 
Alison Renteln, from an anthropologist’s point of view, opts for a cross-cultural 
analysis to reach a universal account of human rights. She argues that: 
“Demonstration of the existence of a universally embraced moral principle would 
provide a much needed foundation for certain human rights.”129  
In addition to these definitions of universalism, we can have a look at 
foundationalist arguments for universal rights. That is to say it might be better to 
look at some arguments as to the source of this universality, rather than, 
tautologically stating that universalism is the universal 
application/validity/presence of a norm. Though Tilley argues that universalism 
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should not be identified with foundationalism,130 most of the proponents of 
universal human rights present human nature, reason or the “simple fact” of being 
human, or some derivative instruments, like contracts, as the foundation of 
universal human rights. In differentiating human rights from other types of rights 
such as constitutional rights, Donnelly states that: “The term human indicates 
both their nature and their source: they are the rights one has simply because one 
is human”131. In this sense, foundationalism is more to do with naturalization, 
neutralization, and depolitization of rights by linking them to essential traits of 
human or the idea of human rather than defining them as absolute and certain 
norms as Tilley claims132. A distinction is made between “human” and the “idea 
of human”, because some scholars like Ken Booth and Jack Donnelly (in his 
latter arguments) make a trick to present their arguments as anti-foundationalist . 
Booth argues that: “we should have human rights not because we are human, but 
to make us human” 133. Similarly, Donnelly argues that: “If the rights specified by 
the underlying theory of human nature are implemented and enforced, they 
should help to bring into being the envisioned type of person, one who is worthy 
of such a life.”134 Reference to an ideal type may be a critical weapon at the 
hands of human rights fighters in their struggle against the status quo. In this 
sense, both Booth’s and Donnelly’s reference to potential and ideal human beings 
(if not the actual ones) as the justification and ground of rights may constitute an 
emancipatory project. But it may well constitute a disciplinary project  on which 
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we will focus in the following section. For our purposes here, on the other hand, 
we need to draw attention to the hollowness of the concept of “human”. Ian 
Hunter’s following expression is worthy of quoting at length: 
The problem lies in the notions of complete person and essential humanness themselves. 
Achievement of complete person is susceptible to particular demands of society. A warrior 
nation would cultivate its members in terms of knights, while for a religious society, essential 
humanness would lie in the priestly behavior. Then, there is no condition of universal 
humanness.135 
 
 
The French conservative Joseph de Maistre’s attack on the French 
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen is well known: “ I have met 
Italians, Russians, Spaniards, Englishmen, Frenchmen, but I do not know man in 
general”136. We can extend this idea that there may be soldiers, nurses, knights, 
priests, doctors, academicians, insane and guardians but not human in general. 
Then, one way or another, the discourse of universal human rights rests upon a 
foundational account of rights. They are justified on various but ultimately 
reductionist forms. 
One of the widest sources of rights is, as stated above, our essential 
quality as being humans. This can be formulated as  Kantian ethics. As we can 
remember from the previous chapter, Kant makes a distinction between 
“categorical, rigid, moral obligation” and “flexible, empirical determinable self-
interest”137. A similar differentiation is also put forward by Vlastos between 
human merits (generosity, honesty, intelligence, courage…etc) and human worth 
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(worth of being human). He strengthens his position with the question that: “Why 
we help someone if we see him/her drowning?”138 Vlastos takes for granted the 
answer that: Because he/she is a human being. Thus, he situates inalienable rights 
on our humanness. However, this seemingly self-evident justification of 
universality is even subject to many empirical and historical challenges. If the 
moral category of “humanness” is such a natural and universal one, one that is 
out of political considerations, how can we explain the exclusion of particular 
groups through some sign boards stating that: “Dogs and Chinese”139, “Jews and 
Dogs”, “…and Dogs” are not admitted”. Also “humanness” may not be the best 
trench after all to fight for the universality of rights given, for instance, that: “The 
Serbs take themselves to be acting in the interests of true humanity by purifying 
the world of psuedo-humanity”140.  In short, given the atrocities committed in the 
name of humanity, “human dignity” may not be such a stable ground to defend 
the universality of rights. 
John Rawls is another philosopher whose position on ethics we have 
already discussed. Rawls establishes the universality of rights on the ground of 
reason. He claims that: “rights are [those] that should be enjoyed by all citizens in 
all modern states and the principles of justice are constituted by the people behind 
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the veil of ignorance”141. Behind the veil of ignorance, stands the person. Rawls’s 
position rests on the belief that people, from even various cultures, act similarly if 
guided by nothing but the dictates of reason. Susan Mendus categorizes Rawls 
under a different heading from that of metaphysical and foundationalist 
approaches. She claims that: “By expounding his theory in this way [rationality 
based], Rawls aim to avoid the charge of metaphysical extravagance often leveled 
at rights theories.”142 Mendus’s understanding of metaphysics is not 
understandable. One of the definitions of metaphysics is: “me ta physica or 
beyond nature, a way of thinking about what lies beyond the sensible and 
immediate experience of things”.143 At this point, reason becomes another arche 
that lies beyond “sensible and immediate experience of things”. That is Rawls, 
for us presents an equally metaphysical perspective. Supporting this point, 
MacIntyre emphasizes the limits of Rawls’s universality. He argues that: 
 
Rawls’s conception of rationality is no more nor less than an account of what we in modern 
Western liberal democracies deem rational and that therefore while Rawls’s account may 
appeal to people like us it can and should carry no weight with people who inhabit entirely 
different kinds of community144 
 
Apart from the categorical approach of Kant and the similar foundation of 
Rawls for rights, some others ground the universality of rights on the universality 
of psychobiological needs. Christian Bay ranks those needs in the order of 
importance as follows: “Physical survival needs”, “social belongingness needs” 
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and “individual subjectivity needs”145. Rights are universal because they are 
universal responses to basic needs of man. Accordingly, one has to be alive first 
in order to demand for other rights. Yet, the act of ranking rights with reference 
to their urgency is contestable. As for instance, it is an equally valid argument 
that one has to be educated (indoctrinated)146 that there are rights in order to 
claim them, thus being alive is not a sufficient condition. In this sense, the 
universality of rights based upon psychobiological needs is not an incontestable 
justification or foundation either. It is not needs per se, but the idea that they are 
seen as rights that gives rise to a discourse of rights. Is it, after all, the biological 
requirement that human beings should be fed to survive, that leads to the 
formulation of a relevant right to food? Is it man’s desire to be the center, his 
self-concern, or his right to be fed that led to the development of 
psychobiological sciences? Because, formulated in this latter sense the foundation 
becomes the construct. Our needs that support our rights may in turn need to be 
supported by our rights in order to be accepted as needs. 
 Whatever the different reasons articulated, the universality of rights has 
been exposed to criticisms from its inception. Jeremy Bentham attacks the 
Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen with following words: 
 
In a play or a novel, an improper word is but a word and the impropriety, whether noticed or 
not, is attended with no consequences. In a body of laws –especially of laws given as 
constitutional and fundamental ones- an improper word may be a natural calamity: and civil 
war may be the consequence of it. Out of one foolish word may start a thousand daggers.147 
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As a British conservative Bentham opposes the universalization of rights 
out of their specific cultural contexts. He defends tradition against reason. 
We have, to some extent, examined how defenders of universal human 
rights formulate their argumentations. Also we have tried to show the fissures in 
those arguments. To sum up the universalist arguments we have examined so far; 
it is argued that human rights should be universal because they rest upon 
foundations that are universal and incontestable. Either because we are all human 
beings, or because we are governed by the dictates of universal reason, we share a 
dignity with the others: the foreigners, outsiders, and of different ethnic, cultural, 
historical origin. Notwithstanding our differences, our being human, in the end, 
unites us all and constitutes the grounds for human rights. As a response to these 
kind of universalist positions, we have argued that given the atrocities committed 
in the name of humanity, the criteria of being human, may be an exclusionary 
ground as well. As we have argued, the search for a fixed identity behind change 
and difference is a metaphysical search. But universalism is not the only 
foundational position; cultural relativism may well be another one. Let’s now 
dwell upon arguments in favor of and against cultural relativism. 
 Cultural relativism, as explained before, takes culture as the source of all 
values and norms including human rights. Tilley summarizes cultural relativism 
as follows: “Although for every culture some moral judgements are valid, no 
moral judgement is universally valid, meaning valid for all cultures. Instead every 
moral judgement is culturally relative.”148 Cultural relativism is usually 
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associated with anthropologists’ point of view; we have already stated how Ken 
Booth defines the concept as the blackbox of the anthropologist. Renteln, in her 
book, focusing on anthropological perspectives to human rights, presents an 
argument in favor of cultural relativism: 
 
It is aimed at getting people to admit that although it may seem to them that their moral 
principles are self-evidently true, and hence seem to be grounds for passing judgment on 
other peoples, in fact, the self-evidence of these principles is a kind of illusion.149 
 
Renteln stresses the importance of culture in shaping people’s value 
judgments. She also states that being honest to the source of criticism is better 
than pretending to be universal.150 She opposes to the view that cultural 
relativism locks its proponents to their contingent traditions asserting that: 
 
There is nothing inherent in the treaty of relativism, which prevents relativists from criticizing 
activities and beliefs in other cultures. But relativists will acknowledge that the criticism is 
based on their own ethno-centric standards and realize also the condemnation may be a form 
of cultural imperialism.151 
 
The opponents of cultural relativism, on the other hand, associate the idea 
with the rhetoric of repressive regimes. Rhoda Howard, a Canadian political 
scientist- argues that: “[cultural relativism is] an ideological tool to serve the 
interests of powerful emergent groups.”152 Ken Booth, having identified cultural 
relativism with cultural essentialism, poses the critical question that: “Why is the 
eradication of difference in the face of (local) communitarian power less worth 
struggling for than any eradication of difference as a result of external 
                                                 
149 Renteln, International Human Rights, p.65. 
150Renteln, International Human Rights, p.77. 
151Renteln, International Human Rights, p.77. 
152 Rhoda E. Howard, 1986, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, Totowa, NJ:Rowman & 
Littlefield, p.17, Peter R. Baehr, 1996, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, London: 
Macmillan Press,  p.14. 
  73  
imperialism?”153  According to this idea, local political authorities that utilize the 
rhetoric of cultural relativism at the face of external intervention, in fact, do not 
recognize the difference within. Cultural relativism, in the name of plurality of 
values, is seen as an intervention to eradicate the difference within from the 
perspective of victims. With a poetic expression Douzinas states well the position 
of the victim: 
From the position of the victim, the bullet and the smart bomb kill equally, even if the former 
travels a few yards only from the gun of the ethnically proud soldier, while the latter covers a 
huge distance from the plane of the humanitarian bomber.154 
 
On the other hand, it’s not fair to associate cultural relativism with only 
the violators of rights, and universalism with human rights activists or victims. 
Nikhil Aziz, an Indian researcher, states while relativistic defenses  are used by 
Asian and other governments to cover up human rights violations. Scholars and 
activists, who are victims of human rights violations, also may adopt “positions 
different from Western standards.”155 It is not the case that if one defends human 
rights she/he should be a proponent of universal values, and a cultural relativist 
should be a potential oppressor or a moral nihilist. John Tilley, for instance, 
associates cultural relativism with moral nihilism. He explains relativist’s 
rejection of universalism as: “It rests on the assumption that we must reject any 
thesis for which we have no decisive proof. To my knowledge, no one has 
decisively proven this assumption so the assumption refutes itself.”156 
Accordingly, as there is no Archimedean point of view, from where we can 
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objectively measure a universal human nature as the basis of the inalienable 
rights of man, we can dismiss any claim of rights. This approach can be defined 
as metaphysical as moral absolutism. If we cannot judge the presence of moral 
values outside of particular contexts, how can we judge their absence? There is a 
line between absolute morality and none morality, we are trying to balance on 
this line, as we did in the previous chapter. 
Ironically, cultural relativism can as much be a barrier to difference as 
universalism. It can be argued that creating identities of “difference” may be 
another totalizing, reductionist black boxing. Culture, when takes the throne 
occupied previously by human nature becomes another tyrant. Costas Douzinas, 
in his critical appraisal of human rights discourse, problematizes also the 
absoluteness of culture or culture as the foundation. He opposes ontological 
description of culture (context) and argues that: “context is malleable, always 
under construction rather than given and unchanging.”157 He calls ethic of 
universalism at local level to the campaigns or policies that rest upon “absolute 
essences and define the meaning and value of culture without remainder or 
exception” and adds that these approaches “can find everything that resists them 
expendable.”158 We can conclude this section that: universality also includes the 
assumption of essential differences159, in this sense, universalism includes 
cultural relativism, and cultural relativism implies universalism at a local level. 
Taken from this point, there may not be much difference between universalism 
and cultural relativism. Just as Douzinas argues: “As they are both determined to 
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see man and community as immanent, the difference between universalism 
premised on the essence of man and a relativism premised on the essence of 
community is small.”160 
Both universalism and cultural relativism may be foundationalist 
approaches to human rights. Foundations may be stepping stones for 
emancipatory movements. Vincent argues that we need justification for social 
acceptance and finally for the effective enforcement of our rights.161 But 
foundations may also be invisible clothes that make the dressed invisible also. 
They may, in other words, discipline and create docile bodies by concealing the 
political nature of rights via their representation as natural essential values. In this 
form, human rights norms can be the representation of representations. Douzinas, 
refers to American Declaration of Independence and French Declaration of 
Rights of Man and Citizen, in stating that: “The essence of “man” lies in this act 
of proclamation in which he linguistically asserts and politically legislates 
without any ground or authority other than himself.”162 
Then the referred human essence or human nature become representations 
of not corresponding facts but representations, and these representations have 
some political consequences. Just like the discourse of national security leads to 
violence and insecurity, the discourse of universal human rights constitute an 
obstacle for a political discourse of rights. Naturalization of rights has 
consequences to those consequences we will now focus on. 
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4.2 Rights as Emancipatory/ Disciplinary Tools 
In an attempt to justify rights, Alan Gewirth takes them as conditions that 
generate successful action.163 In order to act successfully, human beings should 
have freedom, and well being. Former, for “controlling the action” latter for 
“having purposes”, since agents not only act but act with purpose.164 As being 
purposive agents or prospective purposive agents, human beings are recognized 
rights to fulfill their actual or prospective functions in the society. Such a 
justification of rights may end up in capsulation of individuals into docile bodies 
that are obedient and socially acceptable. The discussion of “rights” as to their 
disciplinary and identity-constitutive power will be our present focus. This can be 
done through a Foucaultian perspective. 
First of all, parallel to our previous discussions on the ‘universality’ of 
human rights, we will try to dwell upon how the discourse of rights play in 
creating docile bodies. In the literature of human rights rights-duties dichotomy is 
a well-known one. The reciprocal relation between these two concepts may imply 
how rights function to soften the control of state on its citizens, by linking the 
provision of rights, in some way, with the satisfaction of duties. Johan Galtung, in 
his structural analysis of human rights points to this problematical nature of 
rights-duties duality stating: “Total rights in principle entitle the state to demand 
total duties in return.”165 Right to education may imply duty to pay your taxes. 
Rights may be given as disciplinary norms in this sense, but this is another 
approach. From Foucaultian point of view, state is only the “codification of 
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power relations” which are already present at the societal level.166 It would be an 
oversimplification to claim that state imposes its power on its citizens via the 
provision and protection of rights, just because it maintains the power to limit 
them or just because it’s entailed to demand duties. There is much behind. It is 
not only an give and take issue. In order to understand what lies beneath, we need 
to problematize this discourse of rights. 
Foucault argues that along with the social contract theories that 
highlighted fundamental rights and freedoms, there was also a dream of the 
military society (increase economic utility and political obedience) with docile 
bodies or “meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine.”167 
One of the main arguments raised in “Discipline and Punish” is that 
towards the end of the 18th century, institutions of normalization such as prisons 
and asylums or schools and army- through the construction of docile bodies-, 
standardized subjects, decreased the costs of coercion. So that traditional violent 
forms of political power of the 16th and 17th centuries is replaced with more 
subtle techniques of normalization. 
 
The normal is established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a 
standardized education and the establishment of the “écoles normales”; it is established in the 
effort to organize a national medical profession and a hospital system capable of operating 
general norms of health… it is established in the standardization of industrial processes and 
products.168 
 
Normalization and standardization techniques are manifested through the 
exercise of power that objectifies those who are to be normalized. Knowledge 
became the whip at the guardian in the dress of medical personnel, 
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instructor…etc. Regimes of truth, in a circular fashion, both introduced and are 
introduced by these institutions of normalization. Discipline, consequently, is 
formalized in such a way that it is to arise the least possible resistance. Discipline 
is made invisible.169  
In this general picture of affairs, the discourse of universal human rights 
strengthen the representation of a universal human nature, or a true human nature. 
Stated as the source of rights, this human nature, like the nature of state, help to 
differentiate normal from abnormal. It becomes a criterion to enjoy rights. Brent 
Pickett addresses Foucault’s critique of liberal rights and states that: “Traditional 
rights, in Foucault’s view, were the pan of the problem because of their reliance 
on a view of people as having a true nature, because this reinforces the process of 
normalization.”170 Then, discipline is the representation of the “human nature” as 
the source of universal rights. 
The naturalization and stabilization of rights based upon a universal 
human nature depoliticizes the discourse of human rights. Though they are quite 
political, in character, rights are protected from the influence of politics by being 
ahistoricised and naturalized as if they are “self evidently inscribed in nature”171 
Wearing Foucaultian spectacles it can be argued that while universal 
human rights are presented as norms that protect and frame inherent values of 
human nature; they are indeed -through diffused systems of micro power- 
inscribed into our bodies. In other words: 
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The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle 
was supported by…tiny, everyday physical mechanisms, by all these systems of micropower 
that are essentially nonegalitarian and asymmetrical which we call the disciplines.172 
 
Then it can further be argued that by naturalizing which are indeed 
products of certain mechanisms, the discourse of universal human rights 
strengthens the invisibility and invincibility of disciplines. For instance, Article 3 
of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, one of the often-referred documents of 
universal human rights, reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person.” 
We can work on this right, to clarify how it works as a disciplinary tool. 
In the “History of Sexuality” Foucault discusses biopolitics. Accordingly, 
improvements in agriculture, industry, science and medicine enabled the conquest 
of the contingencies of life, i.e. the thin line between life and death. This shift of 
attention from death to life, paved the way for the development of a discourse 
around the acceptable forms of life. Power is manifested more in taking charge of 
life, rather than on the threat of death.173   
This is not to say that capital and corporal punishment was then abolished. 
But to argue that life has become a concern. Through Biopolitics, control of the 
life and population became new domains of investment. In this sense, “a 
normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered 
on life.”174 It is first and foremost the objectification of life that is forming a body 
of knowledge of life that prepared the ground for normalizing/ disciplining 
society. 
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Coming back to the function of the above mentioned right in this 
normalized society, it could be argued that in presenting the political as the 
essential, it reinforces and naturalizes authoritive discourse. At this point 
Foucault argues that the reference, by resistants, to the “right to life, to one’s 
body, to health…to satisfaction of needs” was compatible with rather than a 
challenge to the power mechanisms that organize the regimes of life.175 
“Right to life” is the normative fulcrum of a society, which normalizes, 
standardizes and disciplines by differentiating acceptable forms of life from 
unacceptable ones. This does not mean that unacceptable life forms are 
condemned to death, but means that they are “encouraged” to be acceptable “for 
their own health and security”. Right to life, liberty and security apart from 
exalting atomized individualism, also makes human beings as subjects of Life. 
Such a right both emancipates individuals from subjecthood, but at the same time 
constitutes new subjects of law. Yet, given the “progress” achieved, one can take 
this disciplinary role as a minor one. As once the control of life was to such an 
extent that suicide was a crime as it was believed to be a usurpation of the power 
of lord below or the Lord above.”176 
Relevant also to this constitution and normalization of subjects, Toby 
Miller in “The Well-Tempered Self” draws the reader’s attention to the 
constitutive power of the discourse of citizenship.177 Miller quotes Nietzsche’s 
expression that: “Snare of language…present[s] all activity as conditioned by an 
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agent –the subject [when in reality] there is no being behind doing, acting, 
becoming”178 
Such metaphysical representations of individuals as the possessor of 
rights can be criticized as totalizing commitments. In this sense, it may be argued 
that, the discourse shaped around the inalienable rights of “man”, “woman”, 
“children” plays a role in the production of subjectivities /selves/ identities with 
inalienable and immutable essences. One of the drawbacks of associating rights 
with abstract individualism can be the marginalization of some groups “who may 
differ from the dominant norm”.179 Indeed most of the criticisms directed against 
the liberal and abstract notion of human rights by feminist circles, for instance, 
underline the narrow reach of rights given the plurality of experiences. It has been 
argued that: “The dominance of a norm is so powerful that it obscures the 
startling fact that most people lie outside its boundaries.”180 Just like interests of 
many, lie outside the boundaries of national interest. 
The truism of these criticisms aside, our major concern is not rights of 
these or those groups but the language of any group of rights as founded upon 
essential principles. Liberal rights (of man) may be balanced by rights of woman. 
But group rights or gender-specific rights as long as they are formulated on 
universal or reductionist terms in one way or another would risk the early and 
simplistic closure at the face of complexities and contingencies. We will 
elaborate more on this issue in the next chapter. 
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Therefore, if the foundational subject181, natural, unprocessed subject, is 
done away with, discourses on this subject, including the discourses of universal 
human rights, need to be evaluated as to their constitutive forces. One of those 
forces can be given as the “domestication” of subjectivities in the sense that 
discourse of rights both empowers and silences.182 On functional basis through 
liberal rights and freedoms, a community identity has been inscribed on citizens. 
As, for instance, the civil right to relative freedom of personal conduct is 
conditioned upon the recognition of the same right for others.183 
The incessant dialogue between rights and their limitations reflects the 
emancipatory and disciplinary function of rights. Rights are not only trumps at 
the hands of citizens vis a vis their states, as mainstream approaches argue, but 
they are also trumps in the hands of states in disciplining their populations. 
Nietzsche in the Daybreak develops an alternative explanation to the right-duty 
hierarchy, where duty bearers have a say on right holders. Accordingly, he 
doesn’t take duty classically as the response of the duty bearer to the right holder. 
But takes duty itself as a right to impinge upon the power of others. Duty 
becomes a right, in other words.  Protection comes out of domination. Nietzsche 
expresses this view as follows: 
 
 
 
It’s …our pride which bids us do our duty- when we do something for others, in return for 
something they have done for us, what we are doing is restoring our self-regard, for in doing 
something for us, these other have impinged upon our sphere of power, and would have 
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continued to have a hand in it, if we did not with the performance of our duty practice a 
requital, that is to say impinge upon their power184. 
 
Adopting a Nietzschean perspective, then, states perform duties for their 
citizens, in order to exercise power upon them. It is a will to power, in other 
words. The enjoyment of rights becomes identical with playing properly the role 
of subjects of those rights. States both empower by recognizing rights of their 
citizens and enslave. Right-holders wear the straitjacket of right-subjects. In order 
to enjoy rights you have to be eligible for them, and this is domestication. 
Moreover, international organizations which are represented as protectors 
of universal human rights play in this game of empowerment-enslavement along 
with individual states, and even they magnify the degree of this process by 
internationalizing/ universalizing the human rights norms. Baehr argues that: 
“Regional organizations are meant to particularize or sharpen universally valid 
standards…”185 Thus, let’s focus on a regional organization for the 
implementation of “universal” human rights norms. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
which entered into force in 1953, and its control organ European Court of Human 
Rights that has permanently been established by Protocol 11 in November 1998 
are represented among the most efficient mechanisms to protect human rights at 
international level. Both because of this, and because it provides us a more 
concrete basis to discuss human rights in international politics, let’s now focus on 
Court practice. To make our discussion concrete, we can focus on the 
implementation of a particular article of the Convention. The European 
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Convention on Human Rights of 1950, by its Article 10 aims to protect the 
freedom of expression stating that: 
 
(1)  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent states from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
As in most of the articles of the convention, first paragraph of the Article 
gives a definition of this freedom, while the second paragraph sets the limitations 
for the exercise of this right. Here, we will try to interpret these paragraphs based 
on a case law and conduct of the Court. 
The freedom of expression is presented by the Court as “…one of the 
basic conditions of the progress of society and for each individuals self 
fulfillment.”186 Therefore restrictions upon the enjoyment of this right should be 
as the Article 10 (2) implies (a) prescribed by law; (b) necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of some values and interests which are enumerated in 
the second paragraph. As the first condition that is “prescribed by law” is a 
relevantly clear one, we will spend much time on the second condition. By 
focusing upon the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” and its 
interpretation by the Court, we will try to problematize the distinction between 
violation and limitation. The Handyside vs. UK is a significant case to clarify this 
problem. So let’s now focus on the merits of this case. 
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Mr. Richard Handyside is the owner of the publishing firm Stage 1, 
opened in 1968. The subject of the case is the original edition of the book titled 
“The Little Red Schoolbook” that was published in 1 April, in the UK.187 The 
book was first published in Denmark in 1969, then in various European and non-
European countries and finally on 1 April 1971, in the UK having been translated 
into English. Book is 208 pages, 30 pence a copy and is distributed through 
ordinary booksellers188, which indicate that a wide circulation and easy access 
were aimed at.  On the other hand, the book was also intended to be made 
available to schoolchildren of the age of twelve and upward. Book contains 
chapters like: Education, Learning, Teachers, Pupils and the system. In the 
chapter pupils, there is a twenty-six-page section concerning sex, with 
subsections like: “masturbation, intercourse, petting, contraceptives, wet 
dreams…etc.” And in the introductory part of the book it has been stated that: 
“This book is meant to be a reference book”189 that is not to be read from cover to 
cover but to be read for only the things one is interested in, choosing the titles 
from the list of contents. 
In the UK, the book has been found to be violating Obscene Publications 
Acts of 1959 and 1964, which reads as follows: 
Obscene is something, …, if  taken as a whole [was] such as to tend to deprave and corrupt 
persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the 
matter contained or embodied in it…190 
 
 
British courts decide the forfeiture of the book, claiming that: 
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Having regard to; 
 
(a) Probable audience of the book, those children at a critical age 
(b) Style of the book, mixing one-sided opinion with the facts and its being 
contrary to societal values 
(c) The fact that the book is meant to be a reference book, then it should be 
more inclusive in chapters; not only psychological but also legal part of the 
issue should be given. 
 
The book is found detrimental to public morals.191 Following the decision 
to seize and forfeit the book, Mr. Handyside brought the case before the 
European Court of Human Rights, alleging that this constituted the breach of his 
freedom of expression as articulated in Article 10. As to the matters of 
“prescription by law” and “legitimate aim pursued” the Court found no difficulty 
in establishing their validity. As it was prescribed by Obscene Publications Acts 
and the legitimate aim was the protection of public morals in the society. 
Yet the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” caused most of the 
trouble. The controversy aroused out of the authority and right of the Court to 
decide upon the necessity of the limitation. The majority of the Court argued that 
the only thing Court could do is to “ensure that the English courts acted 
reasonably in good faith and within the limits of margin of appreciation left to 
the contracting states by Article 10 (2).”192 This expression of “margin of 
appreciation” is fundamental to understand Court’s general inclination in the 
protection of “societal interests”. On the other hand, a minority in the Court 
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stated that “the Court should examine the schoolbook, directly in the light of the 
Convention and nothing but of Convention.”193 
Those who defend the first argument argued that: “the machinery of 
protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems 
safeguarding human rights” because “it is not possible to find in the domestic law 
of the various contracting states a uniform [conception of legitimate aims].”194 
Therefore, state authorities are given better situation to assess the proportionality 
of limitations and freedoms. Though the Court is ultimately given a supervisory 
function over states. Judge Speilman’s dissenting opinion with regards to the 
utilization of margin of appreciation after another case (Muller and others vs. 
Switzerland) merits quotation: 
 
The Court’s approach to states superior ability to judge the protection of morals could make it 
impossible for an international court to find any violation of Article 10, as the second 
paragraph of that Article could always apply.195 
 
  
 
Restrictions to the enjoyment of rights put the empowered individuals in 
order. As each society is in a better position to assess their own conditions. Either 
in the form of cultural relativism or in the form of national security eradication of 
difference restarts. 
The subsidiary function of the Court vis a vis states can be interpreted on 
various grounds. It can be, from a realist outlook, argued that as (like all 
international organizations) the European Court of Human Rights is an 
international body composed of state representatives, it’s natural that interests of 
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states would overrule all other considerations. On the other hand, if we don’t 
want to be so much apologetic, it can be argued that we need to strike a balance 
between the interests of individuals and societies and states, Court ultimately 
carries out this function. Of course there are many occasions when the Court 
decides contrary to the will of the states. Yet when examined more in detail, it 
becomes apparent that the procedural power of the Court above states is much 
more than its substantial power. When it comes to the delicate issue of 
establishing which act is more acceptable and reasonable in a democratic society 
and consequently establishing which restriction is “necessary in a democratic 
society”, the Court acts as a shadow of the states. In short, the Court interprets 
“necessary in a democratic society” in such a way that enjoyment of rights 
require that subjects be always docile, they should be qualified to be right-
holders. 
Being one of the most efficient regional organizations in safeguarding 
universal human rights; European Court of Human Rights also safeguards the 
disciplinary power of states. Again, this may be attributable not to a particular 
deficiency of the Court, but to the modern discourse of human rights. In other 
words, it is not to argue that states and international organizations could not 
protect and provide human rights, sufficiently well; but to argue that human 
rights discourse is as disciplinary as is emancipatory. In this sense, Toby Miller’s 
following expression finds its place: “Liberties and disciplines are the dual 
inheritance of the Enlightenment, whereby the subjection of “force and bodies” 
must accompany guarantees of sovereignty.”196 Similarly, Douzinas draws our 
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attention to the Janus-like character of rights in dominating as well as 
emancipating human beings as making them both subjectus (subjected) and 
subjectum (agent of morality; the author of law).197 If we take rights as 
empowerments from another side we need also to acknowledge that they define 
the boundaries of proper subject. Right to freedom of expression requires meeting 
the expectations of society. Also, if this right is justified with reference to 
universal nature, it may become an oppressive and exclusionary criterion. This 
issue will be discussed in detail, in the following chapter. In this chapter, on the 
other hand, we have tried to problematize foundations of various human rights 
discourses” universalist and relativist. In doing so, we aimed to show the 
metaphysical aspect of such formulations. Also we have tried to problematize the 
separation between empowerment and enslavement, through introducing 
Foucault’s perspective to this study. 
Some like Christian Reus-Smit, resists the depiction of state sovereignty 
and rights in oppositional terms based on arguments like in contemporary politics 
states’ recognition depends upon their satisfaction of various normative criteria 
like human rights.198 So they emphasize the power of norms in the constitution of 
identities and units of international politics. This may be one way of pronouncing 
rights and sovereignty not in oppositional terms but in a homologous and 
symbiotic relation. Yet, in this section we tried to focus on this issue from another 
perspective, namely the disciplinary power of rights. Taken as such, human rights 
norms cease to be a challenge to the sovereignty of states and rather they become 
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the norms neutralizing, de-politicizing and consequently rendering untouchable 
this sovereignty. 
This, of course, concerns the metaphysical narratives of rights and thus 
has direct links with our discussion on universality vs. cultural relativism as two 
foundations for rights. When the internationalization of human rights stands upon 
these foundations, and especially universalism (by way of reference to a universal 
human nature at international treaties on human rights for instance), it ends up de-
politicizing rights internationally. The definition of humanness in advance, as the 
ground for rights (whatever the particular ideology behind this definition; 
liberalism, socialism…etc.), according to Douzinas, leads to the dogmatic 
exclusion of other possibilities.199 In explaining this argument Douzinas refers to 
Heidegger, we will turn to Heideggerian understanding of ethics and alternative 
approaches to human rights at international politics that avoids a dogmatic 
exclusion in the following chapter. 
For the purposes of this chapter though, it is enough to recapitulate that a 
discourse of human rights based upon foundational accounts of humanness, 
which is the dominant one at the contemporary international politics, is bound to 
be hostile to different possibilities of “humanness”. Such an account of human 
rights cannot be remedy but cause of man-made disasters. To paraphrase Jeremy 
Bentham, in the name of humanity “may start a thousand daggers.” 
In the light of the discussions of this chapter, regarding the place of 
human rights at international politics, it can be argued that they are not 
necessarily in opposition with state security and state interests. Also it is 
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important to keep in mind that, norms as long as they are not open to political 
negotiation, maintain the boundary between “us” and “them”. Foundationalist 
approaches not only limits possibilities for international politics or ethics, but also 
for politics of human rights. Thus, we will conclude our discussion on 
international politics, ethics and human rights, with the examination of alternative 
approaches to ethics and human rights in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V:  INCLUDING THE OTHER / 
                          BEYOND FOUNDATIONS… 
 
We have so far had an idea about foundationalist ethics. Chapter 2 
presented the philosophical bedrock of this understanding, while Chapter 3 
focused on its discursive power in the narratives of universal human rights. We 
have already discussed the constraining and constitutive power of ethics with 
universal foundations. In this last chapter we will continue with our critical 
approach to modern ethics and try to offer alternative approaches. It is important 
to bear in mind that ‘alternative’ here does not mean a brand new narrative or 
design of ethics that will substitute the previous ones. Rather, it is an alternative 
way of approaching morality founded upon the Enlightenment mentality and an 
alternative way of bringing in these possibilities that are left out of this mentality.  
    Zygmunt Bauman, whose works we will often refer to in this chapter, 
makes a distinction between ethics and morality and associates ethics with a code 
of law “that sets apart good from evil once for all and everybody”.200 He then 
argues that morality without ethics would be a morality freed from the stiff cage 
with potentials to embrace “inter-human togetherness”.201  
Rather than an ontological separation of “self” and the “other”, inclusion 
of the “other” or in Levinasian terms accepting the “disposition towards alterity 
within the subject”202 is presented as the gist of this inter-human togetherness. In 
the following pages we will return back to this, what may be termed as, 
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existential questions of ethics. However, our focus on them will be limited and 
based more on the readings of secondary literature of Levinas.  
Instead of a moral decision arising out of the unexpectable and mysterious 
encounter with the other, an ethics structured upon premises and precepts, argues 
Bauman, is not moral but procedural: 
Pointing my finger at the rules, representing my bond with the other as an item in the set of 
similar bonds, a specimen of a category, a case of a general rule. I avoid all responsibility 
except a procedural one.203    
 
But this is not the all. Ethics without foundations or morality without 
ethics is not preferred just because the foundational ethics is procedural but also it 
is violent, exclusionary and “immoral”. This thought can be compared with 
Heidegger’s similar opposition to “humanism” as: “…this opposition does not 
mean that such thinking aligns itself against the humane and advocates the 
inhuman, that it promotes the inhuman and deprecates the dignity of man. 
Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of man high 
enough”.204  
Here the point is universal ethics and “humanistic” appeals refer back to a 
design of society, of man, of the self. On the other hand, this design is not an 
actual, but an imagined one, a signifier without a signified.  Consequently, the 
realization of this design is not a smooth and natural one. As a response to 
principles established on the nature of human beings205, Bauman argues: “…true 
nature of humans was not what they were, tangibly and concretely, but precisely 
                                                 
203  Zygmunt Bauman, 1993, Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality, Blackwell, 
Cambridge, p. 63.  
204 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” in David F. Kroll (ed), Basic Writings: Martin 
Heidegger, London, Routledge, p.225, in David Campel “Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles, 
and Post-structuralism” in Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 1998, Vol. 27, No. 3, p.505.  
  94  
what they were not and could not without push and pull, the true nature was 
unfulfilled, still waiting to be let out”206. From this perspective foundations cease 
to be foundations as they are still to be, still the future perfect. On the other hand, 
in the previous chapter we have also argued that potentials, not the actual, are the 
driving motive behind ethics that works not for the status quo, but for the ideals, 
in other words future perfect, reference to human potentials is the progressive 
force.   
In fact, this is the very point where violence starts, where ‘moralization’ 
of the ‘immoral’ is nothing but a small step in the huge project of perfection: 
Perfection means the eradication of imperfect. Bauman assigns a chapter on 
tracing the idea behind extermination camps of Nazi Germany back to the 
Enlightenment discourse on progress. It is important to see what outcomes 
progressivist ideas might cause; therefore Bauman’s following statement needs to 
be given at length: 
 
People were to be educated into a new, orderly world: some of them, who were diagnosed 
incapable of absorbing such patterns of conduct, as their education was to install, were 
classified as pathological cases and had to be cured if possible; some others were visibly 
unwilling to surrender to such patterns and – as devils or criminals – had to be reformed by 
severe punishments; finally those immune to treatment and chastening had to be separated 
from the “healthy” and the “normal” and incarcerated or otherwise ‘eliminated’. 207    
 
Therefore the root cause of extermination camps was not the irrational 
dreams of a mad man called Hitler, but two centuries old anxiety for healthy 
perfection and hygiene208. Then, how come people in the 20th century without 
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condemning Enlightenment thought on progress and perfection became able to 
condemn Holocaust? Bauman offers a very short and direct answer: “because 
they (Nazis) were defeated”209. Now, this is not a self-explanatory statement and 
needs further elaboration. My interpretation of ‘defeat’ here is not military defeat. 
Because people can condemn atrocities everywhere, like recently in Middle East, 
without waiting the conclusion of the conflicts and without identifying those 
defeated and those who become victorious. Also only from a very narrow 
perspective, that of state-centric, we can command a definition of defeat and 
victory. 
An alternative reading of ‘defeat’ may be the establishment of sympathy 
with the victim. Once those exterminated are started to be seen not as diseases to 
the society but as part of that society, ‘extermination’ can be condemned. That is 
why sympathy preponderates abstract and moral maxims from Brennan’s 
perspective. Eileen Brennan argues that: “…the fundamental virtues of the ability 
to sympathize that defines a measure more original than the maxims, rules, 
imperatives and standards of deontological morals”.210 Once the victims of 
Holocaust are started to be sympathized, this indicates the defeat of Nazi 
Germany. On the other hand, if these victims were seen, still, as threats to societal 
health, then the reverse might have become the case. 
        Turning back to our original issue, the question of progressivism 
may be the menace rather than a remedy for man-made suffering. The 
transcendence of limits becomes such an ambitious project that “means precede 
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the goals, it is the availability of means that triggers the ferocious search for 
ends.”211 We imagine a perfect society, then we make a plan to realize this ideal, 
and we always concentrate on how better we can improve our means to it, as if 
there were only one perfect society. 
Biological knowledge can be used in medicine to cure, but it can also be 
used in detainment centers to torture. And it is further from that torture can be the 
‘treatment’, ‘cure’ of the undesired, dangerous part and vice versa. Then we may 
need to replace the question “what can we do?” with “what do we aim to do?” 
The answer to the latter question is not and will not be settled once for all; but 
will be redecided on and on, in every confrontation with the other, the 
mysterious, the unknown. That is why the means-ends discussion above is not a 
‘welcome back to Kantian ethics’.  
Jacques Derrida’s concept of ‘undecidability’ with reference to ethics may 
be helpful in clarifying the above raised argument. Accordingly, if I knew what to 
do a priori, if I apply a maxim to an action, it would not amount to ethics or 
politics, but would be application of a rule. Ethics starts with undecidability. 
Derrida argues in this sense: “… there would be no decision, in the strong sense 
of the word, in ethics, in politics, no decision and thus no responsibility, without 
the experience of some undecidability”212. 
Ethics starts with undecidability, because ethics starts with the face-to-
face relation with the mysterious other. In Bauman’s terms: “moral collectivity is 
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‘le face-à-face sans intermédiare’”213. We cannot know beforehand, because we 
cannot know the other. Other becomes self’s limit and possibility. 
Now, understanding this ‘other’ is very much important to understand 
alternative approaches to ethics not structured upon the separation of self and the 
other. This is a huge debate on its own, and it cannot be covered in full in this 
chapter. Therefore, we will try to present the general idea cursorily. 
Levinas starts his deliberation on ethics with questioning ‘consciousness’ 
and ‘existence’, but not the existence of this or that object, as did Descartes, but 
existence itself.  Following Husserlian phenomenology, Levinas concludes that 
consciousness depends upon an internal relation between the subject and the 
object; none of them precedes the other214. It may be argued that it is not only ‘I 
think, therefore I am’, but also vice versa and this goes infinitely. In this sense, 
unity, not the separation, of subject/self and object/other becomes the condition 
of existence/consciousness. Levinas takes ‘death’ as the greatest other of life, the 
greatest unknowable. 
 
Death is impossibility of having a project. This approach of death indicates that we are in 
relation with something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not as a 
provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but as something whose very 
existence is made of alterity215. 
 
He then formulates other not as other of the self in a Kantian sense 
(another of me, like me, in whose shoes I can put myself), but takes self as the 
other. At this point the connotation of death with the mysterious should be 
highlighted. Death is something incontrollable and it is the very limit of 
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consciousness (existence). Bauman argues: “death is taken as the biggest 
challenge to human potentials, and as one can do nothing about it, when taken in 
its totality, it is decomposed into multitude of diseases and abnormalities and 
pathological mutations, and consequently those fragments of death are targeted 
at”216. Levinas, in the image of death, takes self as the other. Therefore no such 
separation is made between self as the subject of moral action and other as the 
object of moral action. Jim George opens up this ‘self as the other’ with reference 
to ethical questions as follows: “ we are all others somewhere to someone, so 
identity is not detachment from the other, but the responsibility towards the other. 
My identity, my self means my responsibility towards the other, an ethical 
postulate. So in this sense, ethics becomes the first philosophy”217. 
Nevertheless the statement “we are all others” should not be mistaken as 
“others are all like us”. Levinas does not in this sense draw a similarity between 
the self and the other. Quite the contrary, the other stands as the mysterious, the 
unknowable: 
 
The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, 
or a sympathy, through which we put ourselves in the other’s place, we recognize the other as 
resembling to us but exterior to us, the relationship with the other is a relationship with the 
mystery.218 
 
The propensity in the self towards the other is the propensity towards the 
mystery. On another occasion Levinas argues that: “My being-in-the-world is the 
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usurpation of the spaces belonging to other man whom I have already 
oppressed… driven out…”219. So the moral concern is not something that we 
acquire as a consequence of our moral reasoning but it is something that we feel. 
We respond morally to the other not even though we do not know it, but precisely 
because we do not know it. This is the ethical side of the story. “One has to 
respond to one’s right to be, not by referring to some abstract and anonymous law 
or judicial entity, but because of one’s fear for the other”220.  
This is why, in our interpretation, ethics starts with undecidability. Also 
Heidegger’s differentiation between subject and self may be important at this 
point. Rejecting the association of Dasein (I) with ‘it’ and underlying the closure 
of the subject, Heidegger agues: 
For the ontological concept of the subject characterizes not the selfhood of the “I” qua self, 
but the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present at hand. To define the 
“I” ontologically as ‘subject’ means to regard it as something always present at hand. 221 
 
These ontological descriptions of the subject limit the possibilities to an 
otherwise political flexible and malleable self. We have already raised similar 
points in the first chapter, referring to Cynthia Weber’s criticism of ontological 
statehood. Likewise, essentialist accounts are taken as limitations or restrictions 
on wide range of possibilities in the ethical encounter with the other. 
For instance, Jim George criticizes essentialist accounts of evil human 
nature or anarchical international system as they prima facie omit any possibility 
of morality. He depicts Cold War mentality as an example of these essentialist 
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narratives222. Rather than only targeting Realism, George claims that a 
postmodern reforming of ethics should start from targeting modernist discourse to 
which Realism owes its premises. He, then, defines modernist discourse as “a 
discourse characterized by a universal homogenized and natural order of things, 
built upon unquestionable premises and on an acontextual, atemporal, and certain 
foundation”223.  
Returning back to Levinas, those narratives of fixed selves lead to 
reducing everything into these accounts of selves and their derivatives according 
to Jim George. George refers to Levinas in explaining this idea: 
 
Traditional ethics, for Levinas, has taken place within the boundaries of self-other opposition, 
but always in a logocentric manner that seeks to reduce the identity of the latter to the identity 
of the former in order, ultimately to privilege and justify the value realm of the former224. 
 
One of the basic principles of Kantian ethics, which we have already 
discussed in chapter 2, ‘treat others in such a way that this could be 
universalizable’ rule, i.e. ‘treat them in the way you want to be treated’ can be 
given as an example of this traditional understanding of ethics. ‘I’ become the 
measure of ethical behavior not the ‘other’. ‘Other’ is either a derivation of the 
self, or if it is something totally uncanny, it needs to be targeted at. 
This reductionism of everything to something ‘known’ and the anxiety to 
establish some sort of relevance with the self lies at the background of traditional 
ethics. Central to our moral relation with others and central to the establishment 
of normative structures stands a claim to know. We owe certain duties towards 
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others who are different from us not because they are different but because in 
some hidden way they are also similar to us. For instance, discussing the 
mushrooming of the new acts of rights in the late 20th century, such as women’s 
rights, Douzinas argues that here emphasis on the difference of women could 
well result in the justification of male domination. As being different entities 
women may be deemed improper subjects of rights. On the other hand, he 
continues, along with discourse of difference, a discourse on similarity (women 
also desire equality, because they have equal dignity with men) strengthened their 
struggle to be counted as new subjects of human rights225. In opposition to 
undecidability, those traditional perspectives rest upon a belief in predictability, 
calculability and thus decidebility. 
Among the new generation rights, environmental rights can be given. 
Within some academic circles those rights are also defined as duties we owe to 
future generations226. If we are discussing the undecidability with regards to 
ethical questions in our immediate presence, it will further be the case with 
regards to morality towards generations that are yet to come.  
D’amato in one of his articles where he discusses our duties to future 
generations to protect global environment, questions the possibility of particular 
duties to people or generations that are not yet born227. D’amato, in this article, 
presents a theorem developed by Derek Parfit in 1976, also known as Parfit’s 
Paradox. Accordingly, any action that we take now will have effects on the fate 
of future generations in abstract, to the extent that their existence or inexistence 
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will be affected by our actions done today. But in a concrete manner we cannot 
calculate the effects of our actions on concrete people of tomorrow, because 
whenever we decide upon to act in a certain manner our addressees cease to be 
those before we have decided to act. As a famous quotation from Parfit’s 
Paradox: 
 
Our intervention in the environment will make a sufficient impact to assure that different 
sperm cells will probably fertilize egg cells in all procreations that take place subsequent to 
our environmental intervention. Different people will be born from those who would have 
been born if we had not intervened in the environment.228    
 
So regardless of having or not having duties towards future generations 
we cannot decide in their place as the very moment of decision is effective upon 
their existence or inexistence. We cannot rationally design and calculate not 
because we cannot command our fate, but because our decisions introduce new 
possibilities that are unknown to us beforehand. 
This discussion above does not have to be interpreted as we cannot know 
therefore we cannot act or should not act, but it can also be interpreted as the 
justifications for our actions may have other fulcra than a claim to know. It can 
likewise be interpreted, as what makes us responsible is the pain of 
undecidability, not the comfort of normative principles.  
Consequently, modern ethics that is founded upon universal principles 
and guidelines transform ‘responsibility’ into mere ‘conformity’ with laws and 
norms. Also it represents the self as the original and neutral (sovereign) entity. 
“Ontology as the first principle” as opposed to “ethics as the first philosophy” 
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implies that we have a metaphysical understanding of being. Also that, from an 
ethical point of view, we take for granted the separation of self and other and only 
then we try to reunite them. We try to establish a kind of moral responsibility 
towards the other artificially with the help of abstract moral principles. 
Moreover the celebration of alterity is exception rather than the rule from 
this perspective. As the other by definition is other to the self; that is, evil to the 
good. It is abnormal, inferior and dangerous. If a moral relation with the other is 
to be established, this requires first drawing a similarity between the self and the 
other. Kate Manzo explains this with reference to Derrida’s concept of 
‘logocentricism’: “Logocentricism treats the familiar as natural and differences as 
self-evident, often saturating both categories of dichotomy with moral judgments 
about good and evil”.229 
On the other hand, when identity is founded in relationship with others 
(intersubjectively), others/alterity become part of the identity. Then ethics or 
responsibility towards the other becomes the rule rather than exception. Ethics 
becomes the first philosophy in Levinasian terms230. But this becomes the case 
not because of a universal first principle like “treat others in such a way that you 
want to be treated”, but because alterity becomes the condition of self. A 
representation of self is founded upon a narrative of alterity, which is not iterable 
(repeatable). Necati Polat, in his article “Poststructuralism, Absence, Mimesis” 
discusses poststructuralism in IR with reference to Wittgenstein and Derrida. 
Taking Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘private language’ as his point of departure, 
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Polat discusses how the iterability requires the transgression of fixity and private 
language. He argues that: “A private language – a language which would consist 
of words with fixed referents – would not succeed in becoming a language”231. 
He takes the example of ‘pain’ and argues that the distinction between pain (as 
individual experience) and pain as the representation (mimesis and signifier) is 
important for communication (language)232. On the other hand, Polat takes such a 
differentiation between pain as signified and pain as signifier as a metaphysical 
one as the former pain (individual experience) cannot be known by any other 
person than who suffers. However, with reference to Wittgenstein Polat argues: 
“a language that is not mimetic, or reproducible, would be a language 
incommunicable and unacquireable”233. Consequently, language or discourse is 
built upon this alterity –communication of the incommunicable. And ‘the self’ 
becomes an effect of discourse. Finally, alterity becomes the condition of self: 
“No prior moral postulate is the ontological prerequisite of the self, is a function 
of alterity”234. This can be read as follows: from a poststructural point of view 
ethics need not stand upon premises and norms, because self is alterity. So there 
is no need to make peace with alterity with the help of norms. 
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5.1 Human Rights Of Multiple Identities 
 
If we are to recapitulate what we have said so far: problematising the 
responsible agent, i.e. self, and reconstructing it in relational terms with the other 
lies at the basis of anti-foundationalist ethics. As a result of this problematization, 
ethics cease to be mere norms, values and prescriptions to be followed; but it 
becomes political, undecidable, always to be reformulated in our daily 
encounters. It is implicated in life not detached from it. Ethics becomes a position 
always open to new subjects. As a result of this, also subjects of human rights 
cease to be fixed, what is generally defined as male, white, and protestant subject 
of the West. Costas Douzinas criticizes this abstract legal subjection. In 
existential terms, Douzinas argues: “the subject of legal and contractual rights 
and agreements stands at the center of universe and asks the law to enforce his 
entitlements without great concern for ethical consideration and without empathy 
for the other”235. As such, it is possible to argue that discourse of universal human 
rights dehumanizes its subjects turning them into abstract entities. Moreover, 
Douzinas writes critically of rights founded upon meta-principles and 
unnegotiatable norms as they put conflicts into intractable position. Because, he 
argues, such abstract rights “ … removes the fight from the terrain of warring 
interests into that of allegedly absolute truths and uncompromising 
entitlements”236.  
Finally, Douzinas offers the liberation of rights from their straitjackets 
and expansion of them to include new subjects. He argues that already the history 
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of rights discourse is amenable to expansion, if one considers how rights 
developed from civil and political to economic, social, and cultural and then to 
group rights. Thus Douzinas argues that rights should not be limited with what is 
‘essential’ in human nature as there is no such essence, rather they should always 
be open to new possibilities of identity237.  
Brent Pickett, whose study we have referred before, examines Foucault’s 
critique of rights. Accordingly, Foucault suggests that fixed and a final list of 
rights should be done away with. Instead, the goal should be to increase the space 
for individual difference.238 
However, this approach (right to difference) may be found problematical 
from several points. To begin with, bearing in mind our discussion in the 
previous chapter regarding the disciplinary function of rights discourse, 
expansion of rights would also mean expansion of discipline through various 
(micro/macro) levels in a society. Also, as we have discussed, stabilization of 
difference would render many forms of oppression invisible. In the sense that gay 
and lesbian rights while empowering their holders also fix their identities to a 
limited representation. Jane Flax, a postmodern feminist, in the “End of 
Innocence” criticizes the language of women’s rights as exclusionary and limited 
in the representation of women. She argues that: “the unity of categories such as 
‘women’ or ‘gender’ was found to depend upon the exclusion of many of the 
experiences of women of color…”239. Yet there is always the possibility that 
rights of “women of color” would exclude rights of “lesbian women of color” and 
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this may go infinitely. Bearing this remark in mind, Flax can be interpreted as 
representations of difference tend to dominate micro differences within. 
Sometimes Poststructuralism is seen as identical with relativism. In our 
discussion of relativism versus universalism in human rights, we tried to show 
how criticism of both positions is possible. While a foundational defense of 
difference may end up with mere localization of heteronomy and suppression, an 
anti-foundational defense of difference may be a remedy for the suppression of 
alterity. By anti-foundational defense of difference, I mean, a defense or 
discourse that is not founded upon strict premises but one that can always be 
reformulated depending on the situation we found ourselves in. It is to side with 
the marginal without having a definition of marginal a priori. Polat discusses the 
position of Poststructuralism towards localization of heteronomy, accordingly: 
“… deconstruction treats the homogenized practices of provincial associations as 
equally suspect, in turn support[s] alterity within those associations”240. 
Another point that needs to be addressed in the modern discourse of 
human rights is the state-citizen relation. The association of rights with territorial 
boundaries is also among the factors that turn rights into disciplinary tools at the 
discretion of states to such an extent that enjoyment or limitations of rights come 
along with the accomplishment of citizenship duties. Membership to a political 
community provides rights for the included, but excludes those who remain 
outside from the enjoyments of rights. Moreover, those who are outside do not 
have to be geographically outside. For instance, Charlotte Hooper argues in her 
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article that enjoyment of rights for some Western societies is conditioned upon 
service to the state to such an extend that “[f]ull citizenship rights are often 
denied to men who do not participate in defending the state”241. These can be 
conscientious objectors as well as homosexuals and many others who do not fall 
in ‘men’ concept of the state.  
Taking into consideration the late 20th century expansion of rights from 
citizens to migrants, refugees and non-citizens, one can argue that provision of 
rights are no longer limited with citizenship. Just like the emergence of citizens’ 
rights can be taken as a revolt against the pre-modern forms of political 
organization, the enlargement of rights to subjects beyond citizens may be taken 
as a revolt against modern forms of politics (the nation-state). 
Simon Chesterman claims that human rights are not limited with citizens’ 
rights otherwise identity would be limited with the boundaries of statehood. 
Rather, history of human rights, Chesterman continues, also empowers self to 
transcend limitations of historico-political structure242. It is not, yet, clear that 
state ceases to be a modal point for organizing identities, as membership or non-
membership is determined still with reference to the state. But the important point 
is that the enjoyment of rights does not always require one to be a loyal citizen of 
its state, if not loyal subject of a particular norm.  
Both the possession of universal of human nature and membership to a 
particular community when taken as eligibility criteria for the enjoyment of rights 
limits political imagination. Both of them take sovereignty as a necessary ground 
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for the enjoyment of rights. Sovereignty in the sense of presence, essence or 
nature243. Either the nature of man or the nature of particular community 
determines the rights to be enjoyed. Likewise when human rights become a 
subject of International Relations discipline either it needs to be justified with 
reference to cosmopolitan principles or with reference to membership to a 
particular community. The idea that we have rights because we are human beings 
(and there can be nothing further from this); or because as being members of a 
particular community we have privileges vis a vis those who are not. Vivienne 
Jabri draws the picture that normative approaches in International Relation either 
center around a Kantian, deontological perspective where the autonomous 
individual is taken as the primary moral agent or center around a “Hegelian 
notion of ethical personhood which comes into being within a situated political 
community”244.  
As an alternative to this mentality Dillon offers an understanding of 
justice parallel to that of Derrida or Levinas, as we have discussed before. 
The stranger and the native discovered themselves as human being in the encounter with one 
another, the call to justice cannot derive from rights sovereignly acknowledged or denied. It 
issues out of something more original than the claim of rights that sovereignties (dis)empower 
– the very absence of any such thing as sovereignty at all.245 
 
Implicated in the ethical relation with the other is the politics of other 
rather than its essence. As most of the time, violence is committed against its 
representation. For example, woman’s representation as a reproductive body 
renders her particularly vulnerable to certain types of violence. It is not possible 
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to address their suffering without addressing their representation. But we may end 
up in an intractable position, as the formulation of women’s rights may result in 
reification of their identities, even constitute their identities. On the other hand, it 
is obvious that a discipline indifferent to sexuality, or a discipline whose 
mainstream discourse is built upon ontological essentialism will be limited in 
targeting rape as a war machine. As Pettman argues: “The comfort woman used 
by the Japanese military and the systemic rape of Bosnian Muslim women as a 
part of a Great Serbian project are disruptions to an international relations 
discourse that does not address issues of sexuality and sexualized violence.”246 
Turning back to Dillon’s above given argument, our reaction to rape of 
Bosnian women is indeed our reaction to representation of women as (essential) 
reproductive bodies that are penetratable. The call to justice issues from the 
absence of a woman nature, whereas the call to violence in the judgement of the 
rapist may issue from it presence: namely, women as penetratable bodies.  
In the absence of sovereignty we are responsible to the one who 
encounters us. Finally, it is this ethical relation with the other, and this sense of 
responsibility that precedes enunciation of rights. In Douzinas words: “Ethical 
responsibility precedes rights, gives them their force and legitimacy and becomes 
the judge of their and of state action.”247 As to the source of this responsibility 
Douzinas gives neither Kantian universal reason nor the spirit of community, but 
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the proximity to the other and the propensity to the uncanny in the self. And he 
continues: 
 
 
 
If there is something through the universal in the discourse of human rights, if a metaphysical 
trait survives their deconstruction, this could perhaps be the recognition of the absolute 
uniqueness of the other person and my moral duty to save and to protect her.248 
 
To conclude what we have said so far ‘emancipating’ the discourse of 
human rights from the state-centric frame of international relations would open us 
new perspectives. First, human rights would empower subjects to such an extent 
that they could transcend beyond their identities, so far structured by territorial 
boundaries. Second, rights will be expandable, therefore never fixed and 
ahistorical. As critical tools human rights retain a distance and stretch beyond the 
boundaries of positive law.249 Finally, outside the strict formalities and procedural 
requirements of impersonal structures, rights will be amenable to change, open to 
the suffering of the victim. Human rights, in short, would cease to be trump cards 
at the hands of the hostile individuals. They will be understood as manifestations 
of our indebtedness to the other as the condition of our possibility. 
The understanding and treatment of the other is important not only for the 
ethical questions in general but also for the treatment of ethics in IR in particular. 
In the first chapter of this study, we have started with a quotation from Richard 
Devetak. Then we have discussed how the distinction between inside and outside 
leads to at worst a territorialization of ethics inside the boundaries of states or at 
best prioritization of our responsibility towards fellow citizens over responsibility 
towards outsiders. In all these discussions it is important to see that the existence 
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of the other depends upon neutralization/stabilization or finally sovereignty of the 
self. This self can be the “I” of interpersonal relations, the dominant ethnic group 
of the ethnic conflicts or it can be the domestic society situated in so-called 
anarchical structure of international relations. In all of these narratives, 
contingency, alterity, and difference are taken as the attributes of the outside, the 
other, while the self is presented as a homogenous and sovereign entity. This 
presentation of self leads to violence (selection and destruction of difference 
within), and it also leads to the externalization of the other. 
On the other hand, in this chapter, we tried to argue that we need to 
reconsider the relation between self and the other not based on some ontological 
representations of the self and the other; but based on a Levinasian understanding 
of the self as the other. It is to celebrate the difference within and it is to 
recognize the integrity of inside and outside. 
Human rights in international politics as long as they remain within the 
traditional discourse of ‘inside and outside’ are bound to be “unethical”. As we 
have tried to show, with reference to Derrida, ethics is something undecidable. If 
we are only complying with international conventions and treaties, then we may 
be identified as praiseworthy subjects of international law. We may know and 
apply procedures and norms but this does not make us responsible or just. That is 
not say that laws are unjust, but as Patricia Molloy says: “Law is… always an 
interpretive act.”250. Law, authority, and sovereignty are always deconstructible. 
Justice lies in not accepting them as they are but problematising, deconstructing 
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them. That is why Derrida famously argues: “Justice is deconstruction”.251 With 
such a perspective of justice Molloy argues: “The Idea of justice is infinite 
because it is irreducible –and it is irreducible because it is owed to the other, 
before any contract and without any recognition or gratitude”252 
Consequently, responsibility is not reducible to the “UN Convention on 
Human Rights”, or the “European Convention on Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms”. Also the source of all these treaties, regulations is not a universal 
human nature. In fact these texts are the founding moments of this ‘human 
nature’, as we have already discussed in Chapter 3. The source is the feeling of 
ethical responsibility towards the unknown other. 
We have tried to show how structures limit our imagination and how they 
constitute the violence in this study. One of the well-founded criticisms against 
post-structural approaches is that they constitute their own structures. If Kantian 
‘rational self’ is a foundation for ethics, Levinasian ‘self as other’ is another 
foundation. Honi Fern Haber argues, as a reply, that we cannot do without 
structures: 
Without some kind of structuring, thought would not even be possible. This is simply the 
logic of thought. This does not, however mean that structure must be understood as being out 
there. On the contrary structures are created and always open to new creative 
interpretations.253 
 
This is what we tried to show in this study. Poststructuralism should not 
be confused with radical relativism or moral nihilism. “We cannot know” does 
not mean that we should not act. But it means that we should carry the 
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responsibility of our actions. Also that, it is the uncanny other who invites us to 
be ethical, not some abstract principles. 
Haber argues that there is a “bad side of Poststructuralism” that it has its 
own universal principle: 
There is a human condition [in postmodernity]; the human condition is that the human 
condition can never be fully articulated; there is no single description of human condition 
ranging over all of its possibilities254 
 
That is true; Poststructuralism has a universal principle of its own: that 
there is not a universal human nature. But this does not mean that difference, not 
similarity, is the only universal condition. We have already discussed how 
postmodernism also “treats the homogenized practices of provincial associations, 
equally suspect.”255 Narratives of essential difference, the belief that things can 
never be similar, is as foundational as the opposite, i.e. narratives of essential 
sameness. 
In a similar fashion, rejection of moral action pointing to the absence of 
universal values, i.e. absence of some sort of a sovereignty is as positivist in 
mentality as celebration of moral action with reference to universal values. Denial 
as well as acceptance are both positivist attitudes based on correspondence. 
On the other hand, when Poststructuralism becomes a critical way of 
addressing simplistic closures, be they human nature or sovereign state; it may 
invite us to action, pointing that there are always alternatives. It is in this sense 
meaningful to conclude this chapter and this study with the following words of 
Haber: “All unities necessarily have a remainder. It is in fact this remainder that 
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encourages the hope that the future can always be different from, and perhaps 
even better than, the past”. 256                                        
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION                  
In this study, we have discussed ethics and human rights in international 
politics. Taken as a whole this is quite a broad subject. However, we have tried to 
narrow it down to the problematization of some mainstream understandings 
regarding the issue at hand. This problematization rested upon the critical and 
postmodern perspectives. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that, it is very 
seldom that those thinkers and authors whose ideas found place in this thesis 
define themselves as “postmodern”. It is basically the name given to those who 
criticize modernity. For some of them this problematization or deconstruction 
plays the function of unsettling power mechanisms behind the dominant 
discourses. Foucault, for instance, brings the relation between discourse and 
power into light in his studies. He uncovers diffused systems of micro power at 
society level. He examines normalization institutions, such as prisons, schools 
and asylums, and discusses the constitution of docile bodies. The hierarchy 
between sane and insane; normal and abnormal comes with the naturalization of 
the former and the defamation of the latter. Furthermore, all types of discourses 
that reinforce the presence of an essence for the being, like a human nature or the 
nature of the state, render invisible the violence behind. Naturalization of the 
boundaries ends up with the naturalization of violence, as the boundaries do not 
exist as such but constituted, shaped, and changed by everyday practices. War is a 
way to divide inside from the outside; celebration of national occasions is another 
way. Military service is a path to produce docile bodies, and holocaust was 
another path. The elimination of the sick part of the body is not considered to be 
an atrocity or savageness as long as it is seen as a treatment to save the whole 
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body. Only when the meaning of health and sickness is determined, we become 
able to draw the line between treatment and infliction of harm. Then the moment 
of defining health and sickness becomes quite vital with regards to further stages.  
The point with regards to social sciences, sometimes natural sciences as 
well, the separation of healthy from sick is not a natural but a political one, so is 
the separation of treatment from harm infliction, security from the insecurity in 
the classical jargon of the IR, emancipation from the enslavement in the rhetoric 
of human rights. It was not our aim to replace state security with human security 
or actors as “states” with actors as “human beings”. Rather we tried to replace an 
ontic account of actors (be they states or human beings) with a political one in the 
first instance and to leave the space and possibility for change.  
We have built our study upon the criticism of some sort of structuring 
behind the narratives of international politics as well as human rights. It is 
without doubt that we came up with our new structures. The antinomy of self-
other is criticized with reference to Levinasian understanding of the self as a 
proximity to the other from the moment of existence. This understanding can well 
be criticized as being a metaphysical one, even different from the metaphysics of 
Kant. Yet, it is equally important to keep in mind that there may not be a 
complete aversion from some sort of structuring. However, as Haber argues: “this 
does not … mean that structure must be understood as being out there. On the 
contrary structures are created and always open to new creative interpretations”257  
Just like the suppression of micro difference within the islands of 
difference is subject to criticism, the narratives that are based upon the absence of 
                                                 
257 Honi Fern Haber, 1994, Beyond Postmodern Politics:Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault, New York: 
Routledge, p.116. 
  118  
truth or absence of any kind of ground to take action are equally suspect. 
Therefore, we have always tried to balance between presence and absence; 
sovereignty and alterity in this thesis. Yet, the emphasis was on the former. A 
continuation of this study can be built upon the criticism of nihilistic approaches, 
or the problematization of some postmodern narratives. 
This study is mainly constituted by theoretical discussions rather than 
exemplification through concrete examples. We have tried to situate the practice 
of European Court of Human Rights in the framework we have drawn. However, 
the analysis remained somewhat restrictive. A further study on this subject 
should, therefore, expand the ideas developed in this thesis, by focusing more on 
the practice that govern the politics of international human rights. Not only 
international organizations in the field of human rights can be discussed with 
regards to the violence they remain part of, but also the whole discourse of 
human rights can further be deconstructed discussing the concepts like 
emancipation versus enslavement.  
Although the chapters of the thesis are tried to be organized within a 
particular frame and remained limited in content, they can each be expanded. 
Each chapter can be a subject of separate study. We tried to benefit from the 
arguments developed by thinkers like Heidegger, Nietzsche, Levinas, and 
Foucault, in order to address the issues we have raised in this study. Nevertheless, 
it is not an extensive study focusing on this authors. Those who are, for the sake 
of this thesis, put under the umbrella concept of “postmodern approaches” 
contain considerable differences. Elaboration of these differences may also be 
subject of another study. 
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Some may argue that problematization of “human rights” should start 
from the problematization of the very concept of “human”. We have tried to do 
this in a very limited sense as well. Because the subject matter of this study was 
not only “human rights”, as should be clear by now. On the other hand, a study 
that focused the discourse of human rights in a more restricted manner, should 
address not only historical development of the concept but also the bio-
psychological narratives behind it.  
We have tried to problematize naked concepts of “state”, “human” and 
“morality”, outside of their political contexts in a very simple sense of the word. 
There are many more naked concepts falling under these general categories like 
“rouge states”; “developed states”; “refugees”; “minorities”…etc.; each can be a 
subject matter of a similar problematization.   
In the antinomy of the self and the other, we have tried to argue against 
the objectification of the other. We have tried to provide, in turn, an 
understanding of ethics that is developed at the face of the victim. An 
understanding of ethics is not based on abstract universal principles but on the 
suffering of the victim. Nothing can be more concrete than the story behind the 
Pulitzer price-winning photograph of Kevin Carter. Carter committed suicide a 
little more than a year after he shot this photograph of the little girl and the 
vulture. 
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The image of the starving child and the violent patience of the vulture 
behind, paved the way for the Pulitzer price for Carter258. From the other side of 
the issue it was more than the image. It was a never ending conflict between the 
scene, as the object, and the photographer as the subject. It was this debate that 
carried Carter to death. What about the relation between us, as the onlookers to 
this photograph, and the little girl? Standing at a symmetrical distance from the 
vulture, what is our responsibility towards the victim?  
It turns out to be, in the end, the distance between the subject and the 
object that lies beneath the attempts to suppress, tame and destroy one which is 
foreign to us. It is the proximity between these two, on the other hand, that makes 
up our sense of responsibility. Problematising the boundaries, in one way, we 
tried to highlight this proximity between the inside and outside; self and the 
other; citizen and the foreigner. Only establishing this proximity, rather than 
                                                 
258 For a detailed discussion of this photograph see Susan D. Moeller, “Dangerous Exposures” in 
Media Studies Center, Journalists in Peril, Media Studies Journal,vol.10, no.4, Fall 1996, pp.55-87. 
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distance, we become able to develop an alternative perspective to the question of 
ethics and human rights in international politics. 
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